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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption has become a "normal" phenomenon all over the 
world, especially after the end (?lthe Cold War and the advent 
~l globalization. 
Jon S.T. Quah1 
Corruption is not a 21 '1 century problem because it "has existed and 
been a problem since the beginning of human history."2 It is "a crime as 
old as time"3 and was "ubiquitous" in ancient Egypt, Israel, Rome and 
I. Jon S.T. Quah, ''The Nonnali7.ation of Corruption: Why it Occurs and What can be 
Done to Minimize it" (Paper prepared for the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, New York, December 2015), p.IJ. 
2. Leslie Holmes, Cormption: A Very· Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 20 15 ), p. I. 
3. Stephen Moore, Power and Corn1ption: The Rotten Core of Gm•ernme/11 and Big 
Business (London: Vision Paperbacks, 1997), pp. 14-2K. 
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Greece:' In Roman law, a bribetaker "soils" his hands as a bribe was 
"filth" and bribe money in both Latin and English was "dirty."5 "Greasing 
the wheels" was a widespread custom in antiquity and corruption was 
commonly practised in Greece, "the cradle of democracy," during the 5'11 
century.6 In The Politics, Aristotle recommended in 350 B.C. that: "to 
protect the treasury from being defrauded, let all money be issued openly 
in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in 
various wards."7 On November 9, 2006, two bronze urns were discovered 
in Baoji City, China, with inscriptions of 111 ancient Chinese characters 
narrating the story of how a noble man, ZHOU Sheng, had bribed the 
parents of a legal investigator to avoid being charged for appropriating 
farmland and slaves in 873 B.C.8 
Surveys conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation in 20 I 0-
2011 and by Worldwide Independent Network/Gallup International in 
2013 indicate that corruption is now the "world's no. I problem." 9 
Corruption is a serious problem all over the world especially after the end 
of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. However, the World 
Bank's taboo on corruption was only broken by its president, James 
Wolfensohn, when he spoke of the negative consequences of the "cancer 
of corruption" on aid programs at its October 1996 annual meeting. 10 
Corruption became an important governance concern among the 
international development community during the 1990s because of its high 
cost and adverse impact on poverty and development in many countries. 
It was estimated by the African Union that African countries lost more 
than US$148 billion per year, or 25 percent of Africa's GDP. 11 Corruption 
exacerbates poverty in a country by reducing investment and economic 
growth and increasing income inequality as lower levels of corruption are 
4. Seymour Manin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz. "Corruption. Culture, and ~vtarkets,'' 
in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (Eds.l. Cui/lire Matters: 1/o\\" Value.~ Slwp(' 
Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 112. 
5. John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 
xvii. 
6. Carlo Albeno Brioschi, Cormption: A Short llistory. trans. Anthony Shugaar 
(Washington. DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), pp. 9-10. 
7. Quoted in Anwar Shah. "Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country 
Circumstances," in Anwar Shah (Ed.). l'erformance Accowuahility cmd Comhming Cormptio11 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), p. 234. 
8. "Corruption alive in China 2800 years ago," Chi11a Dai~r. November 19, 2006. 
9. Holmes, Corn1ption. p. xiii. 
10. Jon S.T. Quah, C11rbing Corn1ption in Asian Co11ntric•.~: An lmpos.~iblc• l>r••am:' 
(Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2011 ), p. 7. 
II. B.C. Smith, Good GO\·ernance and Derelopment (Basingstokc: Palgravc Macmillan, 
2007), p. 175. 
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statistically associated with lower levels of income inequality. 12 Hence, it 
is not surprising that corruption has been identified as an important global 
issue affecting development. 13 
The globali7..ation of corruption has contributed to an overriding 
concern among governments and international organizations on how to 
combat corruption in many countries. The globalization of electronic 
communications has increased the opportunities for corruption, "the 
difficulty in controlling it, and the potential damage it can inflict" because 
of the case in transferring money across borders and laundering "funds of 
dubious origin. "14 International organizations like the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World 
Bank, have organized many international conferences and workshops on 
the causes, consequences and control of corruption in various countries 
since the 1990sY 
Table 1: 27 Asian Countries by CPI Scores in 2016 
CPI Countries No.(%) 
Score• 
80- I 00 Singaoore (84) I (3.7%) 
70- 79 Hong Kong SAR (77), Japan (72) 2 (7.4%) 
60- 69 Bhutan (65), Taiwan (61) 2 (7.4%) 
50- 59 Brunei Darussalam (58) 2 (7.4%) 
South Korea (53) 
()- 49 Malaysia (49), China, India (40) 20 (74.1%) 
Mongolia (38), Indonesia (37) 
Maldives, Sri Lanka (36) 
Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste 
(35), Vietnam (33), Pakistan (32) 
Lao PDR (30), Nepal (29) 
Mvanmar, Paoua New Guinea (28) 
12. Bertram I. Spector, Detecting Corntption in Del•eloping Coumries: ldemifying 
Cal/ses!Strmegiesfor Action (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2012), pp. 25-32. 
13. Vinay Bhargava. "Curing the Cancer of Corruption," in Vinay K. Bhargava (Ed.). 
(1/obal I.Wit'.t /iJr (ifolml Citi=ens: :ltl lmrodllcticm to Key Del·e/opment Challenges 
( Wa<hingtnn, nr: World Rank. 2001l). Chapter I R. pp. :141-:170. 
14. Patrick Glynn, Stephen J. Kubrin and Moiscs Naim, "The Globalization of Corruption," 
in Kimberly Ann Elliott (F.d.), Cormption and the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute 
for lnlcm:uional Economics, 1'>'>7), pp. 12, 14-15. 
15. Sec for example, Sahr J. Kpundch and Irene Hors (Eds.), Corntption and /11/egri~l' 
lmprm·ement lnitiath·es in /Jew/oping Countries (New York: UNDP, 1998) and ADB and 
OECU, Combating Corntptiollill Asian a11d Pacijic t:conomies (Mamla: AUH. :.!UUU). 
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Bangladesh (26), Cambodia (21) 
Afghanistan ( 15), North Korea ( 12) 
Total 27 countries 27 (100%) 
•The CPI score ranges from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (highly clean). To be included in the 
CPI, a country must have three independent surveys on its perceived extent of public sector 
corruption . 
."iource: "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016," Berlin, available at: 
https:/ /www. transparcncy.orglncws/fcaturc/corruption_perccptions_indcx_20 16 
(accessed January 25, 20 17 ). 
5 
Social problems are "wicked" because they arc "ill-defined," "rely 
upon elusive political judgment for resolution" and arc "never solved.'*' 
Corruption is a "wicked problem"17 in many Asian countries in spite of 
their anti-corruption efforts during the past six decades. Their 
disappointing performance on Transparency International's Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2016 is shown in Table 1, which indicates that 
only seven countries have CPI scores above 50, with Singapore being the 
least corrupt Asian country as it is ranked 7'h among 176 countries with a 
score of 84. By contrast, the other 20 countries (74.1 percent) have low 
scores ranging from 12 for North Korea to 49 for Malaysia. 
Why have their anti-corruption initiatives failed and what can Asian 
policymakers do to minimize corruption in their countries? Unlike 
previous efforts, 18 this monograph addresses these questions by 
identifying the contextual constraints influencing the implementation of 
anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in six Asian countries. Its main thesis is 
that most ACAs in Asian countries have failed not only because of the lack 
of political will and capacity but also because their policymakers have not 
addressed the causes of corruption. Gregory contends that "policy advice 
is needed to better inform the policy decisions taken and to try to ensure 
that the prospects for policy effectiveness are maximized and the risk of 
16. llorst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," 
Policy Sciences, 4 (2) (June 1973): 160. 
17. Romeo 0. Ocampo, "Wicked [>roblems, Government Failures: Corruption and Lesser 
Evils ... Philippine Journal of Public Adminislrulion, 54 ( 1-2) (January-December 20 10): 44. 
I!!. For example, Robert Klitgaard, Ronald Maclcan-Abaroa and H. Lindsey Parris. 
Cormpl Cilies: A Praclical Guide /o Cure and Pre,·enlion (Oakland, CA: Institute for 
Contemporary Studies, 2000) is based on the three case studies of Hong Kong, La Paz in Bolivia, 
and New York City. Bertrand de Spcville, Owrcoming Cormplion: The Esselllials (Richmond, 
UK: de Spcville & Associates, 2010) provides advice to policymakcrs based on his experience 
as llon~t Kon~t's ICAC Commissioner from 1992-1997, The latest effort is Robert I. Rotberg, 
7111! Cormplion Cure: How Cilizens ami Leaders can Combal Grc!fi (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2017), Chapters 10-11, pp. 290-312. 
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policy failure minimized." 1'> This monograph provides advice to 
policymakers to enhance their political will to minimize corruption and is 
written for Asian policymakers and anti-corruption practitioners 
concerned with enhancing the effectiveness of their A CAs. Nevertheless, 
the lessons for combating corruption in Asian countries might also be 
useful for policymakers in other countries if the contextual differences are 
taken into account. 
Asian countries employ three patterns of corruption control 
depending on the number of ACAs used to enforce the anti-corruption 
laws. 20 Table 2 shows that the first pattern of implementing the anti-
corruption laws without relying on an ACA is practised in Japan and Papua 
New Guinea. The second pattern refers to Afghanistan, China, India, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam that rely on multiple ACAs to 
curb corruption. The third and most popular pattern of relying on a single 
ACA was pioneered by Singapore with the establishment of the Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in September 1952 and replicated 
in February 1974 with the formation of the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. The success of the CPIB and 
ICAC in minimizing corruption has promoted the belief that ACAs are 
effective in combating corruption21 and led to the proliferation of nearly 
150 A CAs around the world. 22 
Table 2: Patterns of Corruption Control in 27 Asian Countries 
Pattern Features Countries 
I Implementing the anti- Japan, Papua New Guinea (2) 
corruption 
laws without an ACA 
2 Reliance on multiple Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, 
ACAs to Philippines. Taiwan, Vietnam (7) 
implement the anti-
corruption laws 
3 Reliance on a single Singapore. llong Kong SAR. Malaysia. 
ACA to implement Brunei Darussalam, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Thailand, Macau SAR, South 
19. Roben Gregory, "l'oliey Advice," in Benrand Hadie, Dirk Herg-Schlosscr and 
Leonardo Morlino (Eds.). l11tenwtimral Enc,rclopedia of Political Science, (Thousand Oaks. 
lA~ SaP.c Puhlicarions, 2011), p. 11!92. 
20. Quah, Curbing CorniJJtion in Asian Countries, pp. 25-29. 
21. UNDP. Practitioners· Guid(•: Capacity Assessmem of Ami-Cormptiotl Agencies {New 
York: UNDP. 2011), p. 8. 
22. Samuel De Jacgerc, "Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Game Changer," 
.limla/.Journal of Public Policy. I {I) (August2012): 80. 
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the anti-corruption Korea, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Bangladesh, 
laws Bhutan, Mongolia, Timor-Leste, 
Cambodia, Myanmar ( 18) 
Source: Compiled by the author. ll1e anti-corruption stmtegies of the six Asian countries 
in bold type are analyzed in this monograph. 
7 
An ACA is a specialized organization established by a government 
to minimize corruption in the country. De Sousa defines an ACA as a 
public funded body of "a durable nature, with a specific mission to fight 
corruption and reduce the opportunity structures propitious for its 
occurrence in society through prevention and repressive mcasures." 23 
Following Charron, an ACA is: (I) separate ti·om other government 
agencies and focuses on preventing and controlling corruption; (2) a 
permanent organization: (3) funded by the government; (4) accountable 
either to parliament, the ministry of justice, or the executive: (5) 
responsible for disseminating information on domestic corruption to the 
media and other law enforcement agencies; and (6) recognized by, and 
accessible to, the general public.2~ There are two types of ACAs in Asian 
countries, depending on the scope of their functions: ( l) Type A: those 
dedicated ACAs that perform only anti-corruption functions: and (2) Type 
B: those diffused ACAs which perform both anti-corruption and non-
corruption-related functions. 
Type A ACAs perform these anti-corruption functions: policy 
development, research, monitoring and coordination of implementation 
measures; prevention of corruption in power structures: education and 
awareness raising; and investigation and prosecution of corruption cases.25 
The first Type A ACA in the world is Singapore's CPIB, which was 
established in September 1952, and followed by the formation of many 
Type A ACAs in other Asian countries. By contrast, Type B ACAs 
perform both anti-corruption and non-corruption-related functions in 
Afghanistan, China, India, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Macau SAR, 
Timor-Leste and South Korea. For example, the Office of the Ombudsman 
(OMB) in the Philippines performs these five functions: ( l) investigation 
of anomalies and inefficiency; (2) prosecution of graft cases in the Special 
Anti-Graft Court; (3) administrative adjudication involving disciplinary 
23. Luis de Sousa, "Anti-Corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance," 
Crime. 1-tm• and Social Change, 53 (I) (February 2010): 5. 
24. Nicholas Charron, "Mapping and Measuring the Impact of Anti-C'omaption Agencies: 
A New Dataset for 18 Countries," (Paper presented at the New Public Management and the 
Quality of Government Conference in Gotcborg, Sweden, November 13-15. 2008), p. 6. 
25. Gorana Klemencic, Janez Stusek. and lncsc Gaika, Speciali::ed Anli-Curntption 
lnslitutions: Rel·iew of Models (Paris: OECD, 2008), pp. 9-10. 
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control of all elective and appointed officials except for members of 
Congress and the Judiciary and impeachable officials; (4) provision of 
assistance by public officials and employees to the public to enhance the 
delivery of services; and ( 5) graft prevention by analyzing anti -corruption 
measures and increasing public awareness and cooperation.26 
Table 2 shows that 18 Asian countries have relied on a single ACA 
while seven Asian countries have relied on multiple ACAs to combat 
corruption. However, because of space constraints, this monograph 
focuses only on these six Asian countries: China, India and Philippines, 
which rely on multiple A CAs; and Singapore, Hong Kong SAR 27 and 
South Korea, which rely on a single ACA.28 Before proceeding further, it 
is necessary to analyze the policy contexts of the Asian countries and their 
impact on the effectiveness of the A CAs. 
II. THE POLICY CONTEXTS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES 
But giving advice that works to make people better ~ff in their 
own eyes requires an understanding of the social, economic, 
political, religious, and cultural context ~(the people to whom 
that advice is being provided . ... Despite the best of illlelllions 
and a high degree ofteclmical expertise, withollt understanding 
of the social context, it is e.ttraordinarily difficult to give good, 
effective advice. 
Lloyd J. Dumas, Janine R. Wedel and Greg Callman2'> 
Scholars have relied on the moralizing, historical, economic and 
ecological approaches for studying corruption in many countries. 30 
Following Riggs, who advocated the use of the ecological approach to 
26. OMB, Annual Report 2008 (Quezon City: OMB. 2009), pp. 7-8. 
27. !long Kong, a Special Adrninistmtivc Region (SAR) of China, is referred to as •• 
country here for convenience. 
28. For an analysis of the anti-corruption strategies in Japan, Taiwan, Thailand. Indonesia 
and Mongolia. sec Quah, Curbing Corn1p1ion in Asian Countries. Chapters 2, 5, 8, I 0 and II. 
respectively. For Myanmar and Vietnam. sec Jon S.T. Quah, "Minimizing Corruption in 
Myanmar: An lmrossihlc llrc.'lm?" and Rohcrt C.rcgory. "Combating Com•rtinn in Vietnam: A 
Commentary,'' Asian taucalion and De••elopment Studh~v. 5 (2) (2016): 175-194, 227-243. 
29. Lloyd J. Dumas, Janine R. Wedel and Greg Calhnan. Confronting Corntplion, /luiltling 
Accmmtahility: /.RSSOIIS from the ll'or/c/ of lntemafllmal llnelopment :lclt•tsmg (New York: 
Palgmve Macmillan, 2010). pp. 5-6. 
30. Sec Amold J. Heidenheimer (Ed.), l'olitica/ Corn~ption: ReadinJ?.~ in Comparatit·e 
Analrsis (New Brunswick, NJ: Tmnsaction Books, 1970) for examples of research on corruption 
using these approaches. 
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compare administrative systems,31 the ecological approach is employed in 
this study because it is more comprehensive and useful than the other three 
approaches. The ecological approach in public administration is based on 
"the idea that public administrators operate in an environment which 
constrains them, but that what the public administrators do may, in tum, 
affect the environment."32 A country's environment influences greatly the 
nature of its public administration in three ways. First, the environment 
determines how the civil servant perceives the problems to be solved, 
identifies the alternatives for dealing with these problems, and mobilizes 
the resources and support needed. Second, the clients to be served or 
regulated, the interest groups and other stakeholders who may support or 
oppose the policy, must be identified. Finally, the impact of the 
consequences of public policies must be assessed within the constraints of 
the environment. 33 
Table 3: The Policy Contexts of 26 Asian Countries a 
Country Land Population Colonial GDPper Political 
area (2016) legacy capita system 
(sq. km) (2016) 
Macau SAR 30 612,170 Portuguese US$73.11!7 SAR, China 
Maldives 298 417,490 Portuguese lJS$8,601 Democracy 
Dutch, 
British 
Singapore 719 5.607.280 British US$52.960 Democracv 
Bong Kong 1,075 7,346,700 British US$43,61!1 SAR,China 
SAR 
Brunei 6,000 423.200 British lJS$26,931! Constitutional 
Darussalam Monarchy 
Timor-Lestc 15,000 1,261!,670 Portue.uese lJS$1. I S!!b Democracy 
Taiwan 36,179 23,540,11110 Japanese lJS$22,598b Democracy 
Bhutan 47,000 797,760 Not US$2,804 Constitutional 
colonized Monarchv 
Sri l.anka 66,000 21.203,000 British US$3,1!35 Democracy 
South Korea 99,274 51.245,710 Japanese US$27,531! Democracv 
North Korea 121.000 25.361!,620 Japanese No data Communist 
Bangladesh 143,991! 162,951,650 British lJSSIJ51! Democracv 
NC]'lll 147,000 28,91!2,770 British IJS$729 Democracy 
Cambodia 181,000 15.762,370 French US$1,269 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Lao I'DR 237,000 6,75!!,350 French US$2,353 Communist 
l'hilinnines 300,000 I 03,320.220 Spanish US$2,951 Democracv 
31. Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Admi11istrcuiv11 (Bombay: Asia Publishing 
House, 1962), pp. 1-2. 
32. Ivan L. Richardson and Sidney Baldwin, Public Admi11istratio11: Gowmmelll ;, Action 
(Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1976). p. 24. 
33. Ibid .• p. 24. 
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United 
States 
Vietnam 331,114 92.701,100 French lJS$2,185 Communist 
Malaysia 332,665 31,187,260 British lJS$9,502 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Japan 377,727 126,994,510 Not l!S$38,894 Constitutional 
colonized Monarchy 
Papua New 463,000 8,084,990 British lJS$2,268 Democracy 
Guinea Australian (2014) 
Thailand 513.115 68,863.510 Not US$5,907 Constitutional 
colonized Monarchy 
Afghanistan 652,000 34,656,030 British US$561 Democracy 
Myanmar 677,000 52,885,220 British lJS$1.275 Transitional 
Democracy 
Pakistan 803,940 193,203,480 British lJS$1,468 Democracy 
Mongolia 1.565,000 3,027,400 Chinese US$3,686 Democracy 
Russian 
Indonesia 1,904,443 261,115.460 Dutch US$3,570 Democmcy 
India 3,287,263 1,324.17 m British lJS$1,709 Democmcv 
China 9,560,900 1,378.66 m Not US$8,123 Communist 
colonized 
•Hong Kong and Macau arc SARs of China. b20 15 figure 
Sources: Economist, Pockel World in Figures 20/6 /:"clition (London: Profile Books, 20 15 ), 
various pages: World Bank. "Population, total," Washin1,'1on. DC, available at: 
hnp://data.worldbank.orglindicator/SP.POP.TOTL and World Bank, "GDP per 
capita( current USS)," Washington, DC, available at: hnp://data. worldbank.orglindicator/ 
NY.GDP.PCAPCO (both accessed August 8, 2017). 
The study of how Asian countries combat corruption must begin with 
an analysis of their policy contexts, which refer to the geographical, 
historical, economic, demographic, cultural, political and legal aspects of 
their environments that influence the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of their anti-corruption measures. 34 The "fragile" nature of 
those Asian countries with high scores on the Fragile States Index (FSI) 
2016 constitutes a serious obstacle to their anti-corruption efforts. The 
importance of considering the policy context in solving public 
administration problems was recognized by Fukuyama who observed that 
"most good solutions" to these problems must "incorporate a great deal of 
context -spcci fie information. "35 
A. Geographical Constraints 
As geography is derived from a Greek word meaning a "description 
of the earth," Kaplan observes that "man's actions arc limited by the 
physical parameters imposed by geography" which serves as "a major 
34. Qua h. ( "urbing Con·uption in Asian Coumrie.~. pp. 30-31. 
35. Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Gorermmce am/World Order in the Twemy-Fir.~t 
Century (London: Profile Books, 2004), p. 58. 
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constraint on-and instigator of-the actions of states." Jc, It is not 
accidental that the poorest countries in the world arc located "where 
geography, by way of soil suitability, supports high population densities, 
but not economic growth-because of distance from ports and 
railhcads.''37 Land-locked countries which are resource-scarce and located 
between "neighbors who either do not have opportunities or do not take 
them" arc condemned to "the slow lane."38 Lacking access to the sea, 
being land-locked exacerbates the constraints on a country's economic, 
political and social development.39 The five Asian countries which are 
land-locked are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Lao People's Democratic Republic 
(PDR), Mongolia and Nepal. 
A country's size defined in terms of its land area is an important 
factor affecting the effectiveness of an ACA because a large country or 
archipelago encounters more problems in implementing anti-conuption 
laws in the provinces or outer islands than a small country or city-state. 
This means that Macau SAR, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, which are 
among the smallest territories shown in Table 3, have encountered fewer 
problems in enforcing anti-corruption laws than China, which is the largest 
Asian country with a land area of 9,560,900 sq. km, and the third largest 
country in the world after Russia and Canada. 40 
Apart from its land area, a country's geographical location can 
promote or hinder its efforts in combating conuption. China shares its 
borders with 14 countries including Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North 
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. China is located in a 
"bad neighborhood" with its neighbors, except Bhutan, having high 
perceived levels of conuption, according to the CPI in 2016.41 
36. Robert D. Kaplan, The Re1·enJ.!e of Geography: What the Map tells 11s aho11t Coming 
Cmljlict.l' and the Bailie against Fate (New York: Random llouse, 2(}12), pp. xix, 29. 
37. Ibid., p. 32. 
38. Paul Collier, The Bouom /Jillion: Why the Poorest Colllltries are Failing and What can 
he Done aholll it (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 55-57. 
39. Keith McLachlan. "Introduction," in Dick Hodder. Sarah J. Lloyd and Keith 
Mclachlan (Eds.), l.and-/.Qcked Sttlles ofAfrictl and Asia (london: Frank Ca~s. 1998). p. 3. 
40. Economist, Pocket World in Figures 2016/:."dition (london: l,rofile Books, 2015). pp. 
14. 132. 
41. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016," Berlin, available at: https://www.transparency. 
orglnews/featurclcorruption_perceptions_index_20 16 (accessed January 25, 20 17). 
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B. Colonial Legacy 
Fonnative historical experiences arc "those circumstances in the past 
with significant transference to the immediate environment"42 of anti-
corruption policy. The most important fonnative historical experience 
influencing the implementation of their governments' anti-corruption 
measures today in many Asian countries is their colonial legacy. Except 
for Bhutan, China, Japan and Thailand, which have not been colonized, 
Table 4 shows that the other 22 Asian countries were colonized by these 
ten countries: Australia, Britain, China, France, Japan, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Russia, Spain and the United States. Tan contends that the 
colonial heritage of the Asian countries is an important factor influencing 
their subsequent development. Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Taiwan have benefited from the infrastructural development, educational 
attainment and commercial development initiated by their colonial 
governments. However, those South and Southeast Asian countries, which 
were acquired to extract raw materials, or to produce cash crops for 
exports, did not benefit from their colonial heritage.43 
The British colonial legacy in Singapore has been more positive than 
the Dutch colonial legacy in Indonesia. The British "invested heavily in 
roads, railways and harbors, and educated the local populations in their 
colonies in the language of international trade, science and technology, 
English." 44 They built a modem transport system from the north of 
Malaya to the south in Singapore, which served as the major port through 
which raw materials were shipped, and manufactured goods were 
imported. Accordingly, extensive port and storage facilities, ship-
chandlery and bunkering facilities, and banking and insurance industries 
were developed by the British to service the many ships passing through 
Singapore and to provide financial services for the importers and 
exporters. The British system of justice and public administration was 
established in Malaya and Singapore to provide the legal and 
administrative framework for commerce. 45 According to Lange, Hong 
Kong and Singapore have "the most impressive developmental 
42. Donald P. Warwick, "Cultural Values and Population Policies: Cases and Contexts.'' in 
John D. Montgomery, Harold D. Lasswell and Joel S. Migdal (Eds.), Pallems of Policy: 
Compamtil'f! and Longiflldinal Studies of Pop11latiot1 1-:l'etlts (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books, 19791, p. 307. 
43. Gerald Tan, Asian Dew!lopmem: At1 lmrodllctiofl to Economic. Social am/ l'olitiml 
Clumge ifl rbia (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 20001, pp. 19 and 21. 
44. Ibid., p. II. 
45. Ibid., p. 12. 
COMBATING ASIAN CORRUPTION 13 
improvements among all former British colonies over the past fifty 
years."46 
Table 4: Colonial Status of Asian Countries 
Colonizer Countries 
Australia Paoua New Guinea 
Britain Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong 
SAR, India, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Paoua New Guinea, Singapore. Sri Lanka 
China Mongolia 
France Cambodia, Lao PDR. Vietnam 
Jaoan North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan 
Netherlands Indonesia 
Portugal Macau SAR, Timor-Lcstc 
Russia Mongolia 
Soain Philippines 
United States Philippines 
Not colonized Bhutan, China, Japan. Thailand 
Source: Compiled by the author 
During the 17'h to 18'h centuries, Britain adopted "a pragmatic 
approach to corruption" as these "founding fathers of British power" -
Francis Bacon, Samuel Pepys and Warren Hastings - had "contentedly 
accepted bribes and never felt a twinge of shame in their souls." 47 
However, Treisman found that former British colonies with common law 
legal systems had significantly lower perceived corruption because of their 
"superior administration of justice" and their "preoccupation with 
procedural fairness even at the expense of social hierarchy.''-'M However, 
this does not apply to all the 11 former British colonies in Asia but only to 
Hong Kong and Singapore, which have benefited from the tradition of 
meritocracy introduced by the British with the establishment of the Public 
Service Commissions in both territories in 1950 and 1951 respectively, 
because recruitment and promotion in their civil services are based on 
merit and not patronage.49 Singapore's economic development is the result 
46. Matthew Lange, l.ineages of Despotism am/ Dt•l't'lopment: British Colonialism and 
State Power (Chieago,IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 189. 
47. Brioschi, Cormptimr. p. 93. 
48. Daniel Treisman, 11re Causes ofCormption: A Cross-National Stul~\' (los Angeles. 
CA: Department of Political Science, University ofCalifomia at Los Angeles, 2000), pp. 31-32 
and 46. 
49. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Cou111ries, pp. 202 and 240. 
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of its "highly effective bureaucratic state with relatively high levels of 
inclusiveness. "50 
By contrast, the Dutch did not invest in infrastructure or educate the 
local population because they were interested in Indonesia for its raw 
materials and spices. 51 Furthermore, unlike the British, the Dutch did not 
introduce the tradition of meritocracy because they did not rely on merit 
to recruit the local civil servants, who were selected by hereditary 
succession.52 Consequently, the Dutch did not leave behind a "workable 
model of public administration, and had done little to train Indonesians for 
responsible positions." 53 The absence of meritocracy in Indonesia's 
public bureaucracy is reflected in the importance of patronage in the 
recruitment and promotion of civil servants and has increased their 
vulnerability to corruption and weakens their capacity to implement public 
policies effectively.54 
The Philippines was colonized by Spain from I 565 to 1898 and by 
the United States from 1898 to I 946. The Spanish colonial administration 
was concerned with two aspects: commercial profit and spreading its 
religion. Corruption was introduced to the Philippines by the Spanish as 
the "low salaries and poor working conditions of the bureaucrats and the 
many opportunities available for corrupt behavior contributed to the 
widespread corruption in the colonial bureaucracy."55 A public office was 
viewed as a grant or favor from the King during the Spanish colonial 
period and "many bureaucrats actually treated the transaction as a business 
-selling an office at a profit and buying a more lucrative one."56 Thus, it 
is not surprising that the Spanish colonial bureaucracy's most serious 
weakness was the "internal moral corruption of its members."57 
50. Lange, Lineages of Despotism and Dewlopment. p. 189. 
51. Tan, Asicm Dewlopment. p. 13. 
52. Quah, Curbing Corn1ption in Asian Countries. p. 361. See also Agus Pramusinto, 
"Weak Central Authority and Fragmented Burcaucmcy: A Study of Policy Implementation in 
Indonesia," in Jon S.T. Quah (Ed.), The Role of the Public Bureaucracy in Poliq· 
Implementation in Fin• :I SEAN Countries (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
pp. 135-136. 
53. Donald P. Warwick, Civil Sen·ice Rtform in Indonesia: Problems and Possibilities 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for Jntemational Development, unpublished confidential 
report, 1978), p. 3. 
54. Quah, Curbing Cormption in Asian Cormtries. p. 363. 
55. Jon S.T. Quah, "Burcaucmtic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative 
Analysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies," Journal ofSoutheast Asian Sllulie.1·, I 3 (I) (March 
1982): 158. 
56. Jose N. Endriga, "Historical Notes on Grall and Corruption in the Philippines," 
PhilippineJormwl tJf/'ub/ic Administration, 23 (3-4) ( 1979): 247-249. 
57. Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucraq in the Philippines (Manila: Institute of Public 
Administration, University ofthc Philippines, 1957), p. 129. 
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Unlike the Spanish, the Americans adopted a secular colonial policy 
that provided the Filipinos with more opportunities for participating in the 
affairs of their country. This was reflected in the creation of a modern civil 
service by the Americans and their efforts to localize it. The First 
Philippine Commission recommended the formation of an efficient and 
non-partisan civil service in 1899. On September 19, 1900, the Second 
Philippine Commission passed an act for the establishment and 
maintenance of an efticient and honest civil service in the Philippines. 58 In 
short, an important legacy of American colonial bureaucracy is the 
introduction of meritocracy in the Philippines. It should also be noted that 
the American colonial bureaucracy was incorrupt because the bureaucrats 
received higher salaries and corrupt ofticials were promptly prosecuted.5'1 
Unfortunately, these two positive aspects of American colonial rule in the 
Philippines have not endured after the attainment of independence in July 
1946 because the contemporary public bureaucracy is afflicted by rampant 
corruption and relies on patronage rather than merit in the recruitment and 
promotion of civil servants. The cultural value of lllang na loob or debt of 
gratitude, promotes nepotism in the Philippines because public officials 
readily perform favors for their relatives, including the appointment of 
unqualified persons. 60 As Filipino parents expect their children to be 
"forever grateful" to them, their children's zllang tza loob to them "should 
be immeasurable and eternal."61 
The French consolidated their influence in Indochina from the middle 
of the 19111 century and in 1887, a unified French colonial administration 
was established in Indochina and marked the culmination of French 
colonial rule in Southeast Asia. They monopolized economic activity in 
Indochina and controlled most of its finance and trade. In 1906, they 
introduced French education and also established tertiary education. 
However, unlike the British, the French "did little to develop their 
Southeast Asian colonies, and concentrated on the export of primary 
products from these territories.''62 Instead of emphasizing the training of 
civil servants like the British, the French introduced political and 
administrative institutions in Indochina by imposing "a complex system 
5!!. Ibid .• p. 191. 
59. Endriga ... Historical Notes on Graft and Corruption in the Philippines," 254. 
60. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Coulllries. p. 132. 
61. Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Mcmagement Approach (Quezon 
City: New Day l'ublishcrs, I9K I), p. 25. 
62. Tan, Asian Development. p. 15. 
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of direct and indirect colonial rule which transferred few important 
government skills to indigenous persons."t>J 
During the colonial period, the rural Vietnamese in central and 
northern Vietnam were governed by the mandarinate and village officials. 
However, by the end of the colonial period, the village structures that had 
moderated their behavior degenerated and contributed to "unprecedented 
levels of corruption, nepotism and patron-clientism."64 The French did not 
train and promote Vietnamese civil servants to higher administrative 
positions except "in the field where they had little actual authority or 
responsibility commensurate with their positions." Consequently, the 
departure of the French administrative personnel when Vietnam became 
independent left a huge vacuum because the Vietnamese officials who 
replaced them had little administrative experience.65 In other words, apart 
from introducing education, the French did not invest in infrastructure, 
introduce meritocracy or provide training for the Vietnamese civil 
servants. 
Portuguese penetration of Asia began when Vasco da Gama reached 
the south western coast of India. 66 The Portuguese "began using Macao 
regularly" in 155567 and administered it from 155768 until December 20, 
1999, when it was returned to the People's Republic of China after 442 
years of Portuguese colonial rule. Portuguese colonialism in Asia and 
Africa was described as "royal, authoritarian, and commercial." 69 
Portugal's colonial administration was based on the four principles of 
political unity, spiritual assimilation, administrative differentiation, and 
economic solidarity. 70 However, corruption, bribery and smuggling 
flourished in the Portuguese empire because the colonial governors and 
63. Frank C. Darling. 7111! Westernization of Asia: A Comparatiw Political Analysis 
(Cambridge. MA: Schenk man Publishing Company, 1980). pp. 128. 131. 
64. John Gilkspie. "The Political-Legal Culture of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Vietnam.'' 
in Tim Lindsey and Howard Dick (Eds.), Cormption in Asia: Rethinkin~ the G01·emance 
f>amdigm (Annandale. NSW: Federation Press. 2002). p. 174. 
65. D.L Rose and V.H. Vu. 111e l'ielllcJme.n• Cil'il Sen·ice -~\·stem (East Lansing. Ml: 
Vietnam Advisory Group, Michigan State University. 1961 ). p. I. 
66. Tan, Asian /Je1·elopment. p. 15. 
67. J.M. Bmga, 7111! Westem Pioneers am/their /JisccJ\'ery of Macao (Macau: lmprensa 
Nacional. 1949), p. 102. 
6!!. Steve Shipp, Macau. China: A Politicalllistory c~fthe Porlllguese Colony's Transition 
to Chinese Rule (Jefferson. NC: Mcfarland & Company. 1997), p. I. 
n9. Bailey W. Diffie ami George D. Winius. FoundtJtions oftlle l'onugu,•se /;'mpire. 1·115-
1580 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 1977). p. 301. 
70. Marcelo Caetano. "Principles and Mcth(l<l~ of Portuguese Colonial Administration," in 
/'rincip/es and Methods of Colonial Aclminhtration (London: Bullcrworths Scientific 
Publications, 1950), p. 86. 
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overseas officials were overworked and underpaid and "had every 
incentive to seek alternative forms of income-particularly since they 
often were forced to draw upon personal funds in order to fulfil their 
overseas assignments. " 71 
Macau was an example of a settler-dominated colony because the 
Portuguese came to live and work there as proprietors and rulers and not 
as farmers. 72 The legacy of Portuguese colonialism in Macau was 
threefold. First, Portuguese became the lingua franca and Catholicism was 
the religion adopted by all the colonies, including Macau, as one of the 
aims of the colonial administration was the "spiritual assimilation" of the 
local population. n Second, the constitution and major institutions, 
including the Macau Civil Service and its personnel system arc based on 
the Portuguese model with no major differences because "the principles 
are the same." 74 The third and most important legacy was "that the 
government of Portuguese Asia was notorious for its corruption" because 
"surrounded by sickness, poverty, and death, by strange customs, 
incredible opulence, and easy companions eager to compromise the 
newcomer," many Portuguese settlers with "basically good morals slipped 
them off on the eastward voyage, only to dress in them again" if they ever 
returned home. However, while they were in Asia, "the trick was to move 
from one office to a grander one every triennium and to invest the 
dishonest gains from one in the illicit opportunities peculiar to the next."75 
Furthermore, "personal connections also played vital roles in the 
fraud and corruption that plagued the Portuguese empire during this era."76 
Many aspects of Portuguese society, including "patronage and 
paternalism, corruption and fraud, commerce and trade, cross-cultural 
communication and exchange" were interrelated and reflected the 
"personal nature of the Portuguese social world and the role of social 
networks in Portuguese society." 77 A major cause of bureaucratic 
corruption in Macau was the Portuguese style of colonial governance, 
which had "an inefficient and parasitic administrative structure," with 
71. Erik Lars Myrup. Power and Cormption in the J:'ar~l' Modern J>m·111~11ese World (Baton 
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 20 15), p. 4. 
72. S.E. Finer, 11re 1/istory of G01-ernme111 from the Earliest Times. Vol. Ill (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 1378. 
73. Braga. The We.uem Pioneers and their /)iscm·ery of Macao. p. 145. 
74. Wong Cham Li, "The Public Personnel System in Macau," Asian Jo11ma/ of P11blic 
Administration. 12 (2)(Dcccmber 1990): 176. 
75. Diffie and Winius, Fo11ndations oft he l'ortllgllese Empire. /415-1580, p. 419. 
76. Myrup, Power am/ Corruption in th'' Ear(!• Modem Portu~uese World. p. 171. 
77. Ibid, pp. 174-175. 
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many civil servants who were "morally inadequate" and corrupt, and a 
highly politicized civil service.78 The civil service was politicized because 
the Portuguese politicians occupying senior positions recruited and 
promoted assistants or middle-level bureaucrats on the basis of political 
considerations instead of merit. 79 
Portuguese colonial rule in Timor-Leste was "often brutal and 
exploitative" because it was primarily extractive with the export of 
sandalwood and coffee and limited investment in infrastructure, health and 
education. Indonesia's invasion of Timor-Leste in 1975 exacerbated the 
situation because it incorporated "the pervasive and systemic corruption" 
in Indonesia into the administration of its 27th province.80 The absence of 
Timorese officials among the senior bureaucrats in Timor-Leste during 
Indonesia's occupation and the rudimentary public infrastructure were two 
important obstacles encountered by the United Nations in its etTorts to 
develop Timor-Leste's administration after the attainment of 
independence in May 2002.81 
C. Economic Development 
There is a great deal of disparity in the level of economic 
development of the Asian countries as reflected in their gross domestic 
product (GOP) per capita, which ranges from US$561 for Afghanistan to 
US$73, 187 for Macau SAR, as shown in Table 3. Among the 27 Asian 
countries included in Transparency International's CPI in 2016, Table 5 
shows that there is a strong association between their CPI scores and GOP 
per capita in 20 16 because, with the exception of Bhutan, the other six 
countries with CPI scores of 50 and above have GOP per capita ranging 
from US$22,598 for Taiwan to US$52,960 for Singapore. 
ACAs must be provided with the required personnel, budget and 
operational autonomy to enable them to perform their functions 
effectively. This means that combating corruption is expensive because 
the government has to provide the ACA with an adequate budget and 
sufficient personneJ.H2 The governments in countries with high GOP per 
78. Lo Shiu Hing, l'olitical De•·e/opme11t ill Macau (Hong Kong: Chinese Uni\'ersity Press, 
1995), p. 176. 
79. Ibid., p. 177. 
80. Benjamin Allen and Edward Anderson, Corruptio11 Assessment: Timor-/.este 
(Washington, DC: Management Systems International and US Agency for International 
Development, September 15, 2009), p. I. 
81. Ibid., p. I. 
82. Jon S.T. Quah, "The Criticallmponancc of J>olitical Will in Combating Corruption in 
Asian Countries." Public Administmtio11 and l'o/icr: A11 Asia-Pacific Journal. Ill (2) (Fall 
2015): 13. 
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capita will be able to allocate the resources needed by their ACAs for 
combating corruption and to pay adequate salaries to their civil servants to 
minimize petty corruption. This means that poor countries like 
Afghanistan and Nepal will require financial and technical assistance in 
fighting corruption from international organizations like the UNDP, the 
World Bank and other donor agencies. For example, Afghanistan was the 
top recipient oftechnical and financial assistance from the UNDP in 2011 
with US$492.5 millionY 
Table 5: CPI Scores and GDP Per Capita of 27 Asian Countries in 
2016 
No. Country CPI 2016 GOP per 
Rank& capita 2016 
Score 
I Singapore 7'h (84) US$52.960 
2 Hong Kong SAR IS'h (77) US$43,681 
3 Japan 2()'h (72) US$38.894 
4 Bhutan 27'h (65) USS2.X04 
5 Taiwan 31" (61) US$22.598" 
6 Brunei Darussalam 41" (58) US$26.938 
7 South Korea 5200 (53) US$27.538 
8 Malaysia ss•h (49) US$9,502 
l) China 79'h (40) US$8,123 
10 India 79'" (40) US$1,709 
II Mongolia 87'" (38) US$3,6X6 
12 Indonesia 90'" (37) US$3,570 
13 Maldives 95'h (36) US$8,601 
14 Sri Lanka 95'h (36) US$3,835 
15 Philippines 101" (35) US$2,951 
16 Thailand 101''(35) US$5.907 
17 Tirnor-Lestc 101" (35) US$1.158• 
18 Vietnam IIJ'h (33) US$2,185 
19 Pakistan 116'h (32) US$1.46!! 
20 Lao PDR 123'd (30) US$2,353 
21 Ncnal 131 51 (29) US$729 
22 Myanmar 1361h (28) US$1.275 
23 Papua New Guinea 136'h (28) USS2.268b 
24 Bangladesh 145'h (26) US$1,35!! 
25 Cambodia 156'h (21) US$1.269 
26 AfL'hanistan 169'h (15) US$561 
27 North Korea 174'h(12) No data 
'2015 figure. ~014 figure. 
lB. UNDP, Annual Rqmrt 101/110/2: The Suswina/Jie l·illllrt.' We Watll (New York: 
UNDP, 2012), p. 36. 
20 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Sources: Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016" and World 
Bank, "GDP per capita (current US$)," Washington DC, available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAPCO (accessed August 8, 2017). 
D. Population and Culture 
The size of a country's population is an important factor influencing 
an ACA's output as the ACAs in countries with larger populations would 
receive more corruption complaints than their counterparts with smaller 
populations. This is clearly shown in Table 6, which compares the number 
of complaints received by the Commission Against Corruption (CAC) in 
Macau SAR and the OMB in the Philippines from 2006 to 20JO.H4 The 
OMB's average number of 12,685 complaints per year during 2006-2010 
is 16 times more than the CAC's average of 795 complaints per year 
during the same period. 
Table 6: Complaints received by Macau's CAC and 
Philippines' OMB, 2006-2010 
Anti-Corruption 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
A2ency 
Commission Against 840 736 796 923 681 795 
Corruption Macau 
SAR 
Office of the 13,602 10,824 13,205 12,736 13,057 12,685 
Ombudsman 
Philippines 
Sources: CAC, Ammal Repor/ 2010 (Macau: CAC, 2011 ), p. II; OMB. Annual Reporl 
2009 (Quezon City: OMB, 2010), p. 32; and OMB, Annual Repor/ 2010 (Quezon City: 
OMB, 2011), p. 5. 
Apart from its size, the ethnic diversity of the population and its 
cultural values and practices also affect the perceived extent of corruption 
and the ACA's effectiveness in curbing corruption. Corruption is viewed 
with different levels of tolerance in various countries. In Thailand, the 
population's tolerant attitude toward corruption constitutes an important 
obstacle to the government's anti-corruption strategy. There is no 
equivalent word for corruption in the Thai language because Thais do not 
view corruption as harmful to the public interest. The closest Thai 
equivalent for corruption is choh rat bang luang, meaning "to defraud the 
state" or stealing from the King, which is risky but not perceived as an 
84. These two ACAs arc comparable because both perform the functions of an Ombudsman 
too. 
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erosion of the public interest. 85 Since "nobody is hurt by corruption," 
Thais tolerate corruption as a way of life and "unlike Westerners, they 
expect their leaders to be corrupt too, and accept the fact as part of life. "86 
In addition to their tolerance for corruption, many Thais also "cringed with 
embarrassment" if important people arc humiliated. Consequently, this 
explains why "Thais are not used to seeing people who used to be in 
authority treated like dirt in that way"87 and why coup leaders arc not 
punished but ignored if they are unsuccessful. 
The Thai population's tolerance for corrupt practices is reflected in 
their identification of these seven levels, which are ranked from less to 
more severe misconduct, with the first three levels deemed as acceptable 
practices and the remaining four levels as unacceptable practices: (I) Sin 
nam jai (gift of goodwill); (2) Khan am ron nam cha (tea money); (3) 
Praplwetmi clwb (improper behavior); (4) Sin bon (bribery); (5) Rith thai 
(extortion); (6) Tlwt jarit tor nathi (dishonesty in duty); and (7) Kan 
klwrrapclwan (corruption).88 For most Thais, the first level ofsinnamjai 
is not viewed as corruption because "namjai or 'good will from the heart' 
is highly valued as a personal attribute in Thai culture" and if inexpensive 
gifts are given by people to show their appreciation for the service they 
have received. 89 In other words, the Thai population's tolerance for 
corruption is explained by the widespread practice of gift-giving by the 
public to otlicials for services rendered to supplement their low salaries.90 
Furthermore, to enhance their promotion prospects, civil servants give 
gifts to their superiors because favoritism is more important than merit in 
determining their career advancement.91 
85. Niels Mulder, Inside Thai Society: lnteqm!tation of Everyday l.ife (Amsterdam: Pepin 
Press,l996),p.l74. 
86. Elliot Kulick and Dick Wilson. Thailand's Tum: Profile of a New Dragcm (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 36. 
87. Victor Mallet, The Trouble with Tigers: 711C Rise and Fall of Southeast Asia (london: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), p. 229. 
88. Sakkarin Niyomsilpa. The l'olitiml Economy of Telecomnumicatimrs Reforms 
(London: Pinter, 2000), pp. 141-142. 
89. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyamngsan, Corntption am/ !Jcmocracr in 
1'/wi/wrd. zoo edition (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1996), pp. 166-167. 
90. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, p. 290. 
91. Likhit Dhimvegin, "The Thai Bureaucratic Elite: A Study of their Promotion and 
Career Advancement Patterns," in Peter S.J. Chen and llans Dieter Evers (Eds.), Swdies in 
ASF.AN Sociology· Urban Society and Social Change (Singapore: Chapmen Enterprises, 1978), 
pp. 97-98. 
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E. Political and Legal Systems 
The political system is perhaps the most important aspect of a 
country's policy context because of the nature of political leadership and 
the strength of its political will to combat corruption. Treisman observes 
that "a long duration of democracy appeared necessary to significantly 
reduce corruption"92 because democracy also provides citizens with "an 
opportunity to punish governments that fail to control corruption." 9·1 
However, Rose-Ackerman has noted that "in democracies the desire for 
re-election will deter corruption so long as the electorate disapproves of 
the practice and has some way of sorting out valid from invalid 
accusations. "94 
Countries which have undergone a peaceful transfer of power 
through free and fair elections are more likely to be effective in combating 
corruption than those regimes which have assumed power through conflict 
or a military coup. Post-conflict countries like Cambodia, Nepal, Papua 
New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, which have endured 
protracted periods of civil war, arc "particularly vulnerable" to corruption 
because of the combined effect of"thc legacy of wartime occupation," the 
management and distribution of "massive influxes of material wealth" 
from natural resources or foreign aid, and the "overall weakness of the 
state."95 
Related to their political systems are the legal systems of Asian 
countries which are influenced by their colonial heritage and are based on 
the common law or civil law systems or a combination of both systems 
with other influences. Asian countries which are former British colonies 
usually adopt the common law system with these four features: (I) there 
is no written constitution or codified laws; (2) judicial decisions are 
binding; (3) there is extensive freedom of contract; and (4) everything is 
permitted that is not expressly prohibited by law. By contrast, Asian 
countries following a civil law system are former French, Dutch, German, 
Spanish or Portuguese colonies with these four features: ( 1) there is a 
written constitution based on specific codes: (2) legislative enactments are 
binding; (3) there is less freedom of contract; and (4) there arc 
92. Treisman, The Causes of Corrnptio11, pp. 40-41. 
93. /\sparisim Ghosh, "Corruption: Refom1's Dark Side," Far Easteml:.i:onomic Rel'ie11·. 
March 20, 1997, p. 20. 
94. Susan Rose-Ackerman. "Democracy and 'Gnmd' Corruption," lmematiotJal !.'ocial 
Scie11ce Journal. /49 (1996): 376. 
95. Samh Dix and Nihal Jayawickrama, Fightillg CorntpliotJ i11 Post-CotJjlict am/ Recol't'l')' 
Simatio11s: /.earning from the Past (New York: UNDP. June 2010), pp. x-xi. 
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constitutional court, administrative court and civil court systems to review 
the consistency oflegislation and administrative acts.96 
A country's legal system is an important factor influencing the 
effectiveness of its ACA because it specifies the nature of the anti-
corruption laws and the ACA 's legal powers and independence. In 
Singapore, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) of 1960 and its 
subsequent amendments provide details of the powers ofthe CPIB.97 The 
powers of Hong Kong's ICAC arc specified in the ICAC Ordinance of 
1974 and the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) of 1971.98 As 
Singapore and Hong Kong are former British colonies, they adopted the 
English common law system with the inclusion of shariah law for 
Muslims in Singapore and Chinese customary law in Hong Kong. 
However, countries with a civil law system would need to make 
structural changes to adopt a CPIB or ICAC-style ACA. For example, 
President MA Ying-jeou ofTaiwan responded to the July 14, 2010 arrest 
of three high court judges and a district prosecutor for bribery by reversing 
his earlier decision of not establishing an ACA.99 On July 20, 2010, he 
announced that "the new agency would not be a carbon copy" ofthe ICAC 
or CPIB, and would come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ), but not report directly to the President. 100 President Ma missed the 
golden opportunity of improving the effectiveness of Taiwan's anti-
corruption measures when the Agency Against Corruption (AAC) was 
established as part of the MOJ in July 2011. As the CPIB and ICAC are 
the most effective Asian ACAs, it is puzzling why President Ma did not 
want to emulate these ACAs in view of his desire to curb corruption 
effectively in Taiwan. 101 He did not explain his decision but one reason is 
that Taiwan's civil law system based on the German model requires 
changes in government structure to establish an independent ACA like the 
CPIB and ICAC. The other more important reason was President Ma's 
lack of support from his party, the Kuomintang, which was responsible for 
96. World Bank, "Key Features of Common Law or Civil Law Systems," Washington DC, 
available at: www.ppp.worldbank.org/publie-private-partnershipllegislation-regulation/ 
framework-assessmentllcgal-systcms/comm on-vs-civil-law (accessed February 10, 2017). 
97. Quah, Curbing Corntption in Asian Countries, pp. 219-221. 
98. Jeremiah K.H. Wong, "The ICAC and its Anti-Corruption Measures," in Rance P.L. 
Lee (Ed.), Corntption and /Is Control in Hong Kong: Situatiom· up to lhe late !'i'eventies (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981 ), pp. 51-59. 
99. Jon S.T. Quah, Taiwan :5 Anti-Corntption SJrategy: Suggestions/or Reform (Baltimore, 
MD: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2010), p. 89. 
100. Ho Ai Li, "Taiwan to set up agency to fight graft," Straits Times. July 21,2010, p. Al8. 
101. Jon S.T. Quah, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five 
Asian Countries," Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (l) (2015): 154-155. 
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the rampant spread of "black gold" politics and vote-buying under the 
leadership of President LEE Teng-hui ( 1988-2000). 102 
F. Difficult Governance Environment of Fragile States 
As the effectiveness of ACAs also depends on their "enabling 
environment,"103 the difficult governance environment of the most fragile 
Asian countries constitutes a serious obstacle to the effective 
implementation of their anti-corruption strategies. The difficult 
governance environment of these fragile states is reflected in their high 
levels of corruption, political instability, government ineffectiveness, and 
low level of the rule of law. Table 7 shows that among the 25 Asian 
countries104 included in the FSI 2016, only Singapore, Japan and South 
Korea have "Very Stable" scores of 32.9, 35.1 and 36.1, respectively. 
Conversely, the remaining 22 countries have higher FSI scores, ranging 
from 56.6 for Mongolia to I 07.9 for Afghanistan. Table 7 also confirms 
that Singapore, Japan and South Korea have higher CPI scores and 
percentile ranks for political stability, government effectiveness, and rule 
of law than North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Afghanistan which are 









Table 7: Difficult Governance Environment of 
25 Asian Countries, 2016 
FSI2016 CPI2016 Political Government 
Rank and Rank and stability effectiveness 
Score Score 2016 2016 
18/178 7/176 99.5 100.0 
(32.9/120) (84/100) 
22/178 20/176 86.2 95.7 
(35.1/120) (72/100) 
231178 52/176 51.9 80.8 
(36.11120) (53/100) 
51/178 87/176 73.3 50.5 
(56.6/120) (38/100) 
56/178 41/176 93.8 81.3 
(62.0/120) (581100) 










102. Editorial, "What is really the 'lee way'?" Taipei Times. March 15, 2000, p. 8; and J. 
Bmce Jacobs and 1-hao Ben Liu, "lee Teng-hui and the Idea of Taiwan," China Quarter(r. 190 
(June 2007): 392. 
I 03. UNDP, Capacity Assessmetll of Ami-Corruption Agencies, p. 27. 
104. Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR and Taiwan are excluded in the FSI2016. 
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(66.11120) (49/100) 
Vietnam 73/178 113/176 51.4 52.9 57.2 
(70.7/120) (33/100) 
Maldives 88/178 95/176 60.0 40.9 36.1 
(74.0/120) (36/100) 
China 92/178 79/176 27.1 67.8 46.2 
(74.9/120) (40/100) 
Indonesia 93/178 90/176 33.3 53.4 38.9 
(74.9/120) (37/100) 
Bhutan 101/178 27/176 82.9 70.2 68.3 
(77.6/120) (65/100) 
Thailand 105/178 101/176 15.7 66.3 55.3 
(78.8/120) (35/100) 
India 109/178 79/176 14.3 57.2 52.4 
(79.6/120) (40/100) 
Lao PDR 1241178 123/176 62.4 39.4 24.0 
(84.4/120) (30/100) 
Philippines 125/178 101/176 I 0.0 51.9 36.5 
(84.7/120) (35/100) 
Papua New 129/178 1361176 29.0 23.6 24.5 
Guinea (86.2/120) (28/100) 
Cambodia 133/178 156/176 52.4 24.5 12.5 
(87.41120) (21/100) 
Sri Lanka 136/178 95/176 49.5 44.7 54.3 
(87.7/120) (36/100) 
Bangladesh 143/178 145/176 10.5 25.5 30.8 
(90.7/120) (261100) 
Timor-Leste 144/178 1011176 43.3 13.9 10.1 
(90.81120) (35/100) 
Nepal 146/178 1311176 19.0 19.7 19.7 
(91.21120) (291100) 
North Korea 149/178 174/176 21.9 3.8 3.4 
(93.91120) ( 121100) 
Myanmar 1531178 136/176 23.3 16.3 16.8 
(96.3/120) (28/100) 
Pakistan 1651178 1161176 1.4 28.8 20.2 
101.7/120) (321100) 
Arghanistan 1701178 169/17(1 1.0 9.6 3.8 
(107.91120) ( 15/100) 
Sources: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016," Washington, DC, 
available at: http://info.worldbank.orglgovcmancclwgi/llreports (accessed October l!, 
2017); Tmnsparcncy International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; and Titc Fund 
for Peace, "Fragile States Index 2016," Washington, DC, available at: hnp://library. 
fundforpcacc.orglfsi 16-rcport (accessed August 8, 2017). 
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Ill. COMBATING CORRUPTION WITH A SINGLE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY (ACA) 
Each State Par~v shall ... ensure the existence of a body or 
bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through 
law et!forcement. Such boc{l' or bodies or persons shall be 
granted the necessmy independence ... to be able to cany out 
theirfunctions effectively and without any undue it!fluence. Such 
persons or sta,ff of such bol{l' or bodies should have the 
appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks. 
Article 36, UNCAC 105 
A. Singapore's Effective Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 
(CPIB) 
Corruption was a serious problem in Singapore during the British 
colonial period but is no longer a problem today, thanks to the CPIB's 
effectiveness, which is reflected in its ranking as the least corrupt Asian 
country with a CPI score of 84 in 2016, and its consistently high 
performance on the other indicators of the perceived extent of corruption 
in 2016 as shown in Table 8. Its effectiveness is also confirmed by its 100 
percent conviction rate and the CPIB Public Perceptions Survey's finding 
that 89 percent of the I ,0 II respondents had rated Singapore positively on 
its efforts in controlling the corruption situation in 2016. ux. 
Table 8: Singapore's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016 
Indicator Sl01~apore's Performance 
Control of Corruption 2.1 (97.1) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 7'h/176 (IWI 00) 
PERC Corruption Survev 1"/16 (1.67/10) 
Diversion of Public Funds 3'd/138 (6.217) 
Irregular Pavments and Bribes 3'd/138 (6.7/7) 
Organized Crime 7'h/ 138 ( 6.417) 
Ethical Behavior of Firms 3'd/138 (6.217) 
Public Trust in Politicians I"/ 138 (6.417) 
Sources: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Asian Intelligence, No. 
944, March 30, 2016, p. I; Transparency International "Comtption Perceptions Index 
2016"; and Klaus Schwab (Ed.), 111e Global Compt•titil·em•s.~ Ht•port 2016-2017 (Geneva: 
World Economic Forum, 2016), p. 319. 
105. United Nations Ollicc on Urugs and Crime, United Nation~ Cml\'t'lltion Agai11st 
Cormption (Vienna: UNODC, 2004), pp. 26-27. 
106. CPJB, Ammal Report 20/6 (Singapore: CPIB. 2017), pp. 7,9. 
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Corruption was widespread in Singapore during the British colonial 
period because ofthe government's weak political will and reliance on the 
ineffective Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) in the Singapore Police Force (SPF) to curb corruption. 
The Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), which was enacted in 
December 1937, made the ACB responsible for corruption control even 
though the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry had found that police 
corruption was rampant in Singapore. The problem of corruption 
deteriorated during the Japanese Occupation (February 1942 to August 
1945) because the high inflation rate made it difficult for civil servants to 
survive on their low salaries. Trading in the black market was a "way of 
life" and nepotism and corruption were "perfectly acceptable" as 
individuals depended on "connections, friends and relatives" to get jobs. 107 
Conditions further worsened after World War II and bureaucratic 
corruption increased because of the inadequate supervision of the poorly 
paid civil servants. 108 
The ACB was inetTective for three reasons. First, as a small police 
unit with 17 personnel, the ACB was inadequate in minimizing corruption 
in the Singapore Civil Service, including the SPF. Second, as the ACB was 
a Type B ACA responsible for corruption control and 15 other non-
corruption-related functions, this meant that combating corruption was 
given lower priority and it had to compete with other branches of the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) for limited manpower and 
resources. Third, the ACB's Achilles' heel was that as part of the SPF it 
could not curb police corruption because of the conflict of interest 
involved. The ACB's weaknesses were exposed by the Opium Hijacking 
scandal of October 1951 when it was discovered that three police 
detectives were part of a gang of robbers who stole a shipment of 1,800 
pounds of opium worth about US$133,330. Investigations revealed that 
some senior police officers were also involved with the robbers and 
importers of the opium. 109 
The ACB's failure made the British colonial government realise that 
it was unwise to rely on the ACB to curb corruption when there was 
widespread police corruption in Singapore. The government rectified its 
mistake by replacing the ACB with the CPIB in September 1952 as a Type 
107. Lee Gek Boi, The Synonan Years: Singapore! 11111it!r Japancsc R11/e /942-1945 
(Singapore: National Archives of Singapore and Epigr.tm. 2005). p. 142. 
108. Quah ... Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countrit..'S ... 161-162. 
109. Jon S.T. Quah, Combating Corruption Singapore·S~\'Ie: Lessons for other Asian 
Co11ntries (Balli more, MD: School of Law, Uni vcrsity of Maryland, 2007 ), pp. 14-16. 
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A ACA outside the SPF'sjurisdiction. However, the CPIB was ineffective 
during its first eight years because of its limited personnel and powers. The 
CPIB had fewer personnel than the ACB as it began operations with R. 
Middleton-Smith as its director and 12 otlicers, who were on short 
secondment from the SPF. The CPIB investigation otlicers' "short 
secondment and limited time and capacity to conduct thorough 
investigations" and "the social stigma of investigating fellow police 
otlicers" had hindered the CPIB's effectiveness. 110 
The People's Action Party (PAP) won the May 1959 general election 
in Singapore and formed the government with LEE Kuan Yew as prime 
minister. In his memoirs, Lee revealed that he and his colleagues were 
determined to keep Singapore free from corruption because they were 
"sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders." 
This was reflected in their wearing "white shirts and white slacks to 
symbolize purity and honesty" in their personal behavior and public life 
when they took the oath of otlice on June 5, 1959. 111 
Learning from the mistakes of the British colonial government, the 
PAP government retained the CPIB as an independent Type A ACA and 
enhanced its effectiveness by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act 
(POCA) in June 1960 to strengthen its legal powers and increasing its 
budget and personnel. The POCA empowers the CPIB director and 
officers to arrest and search persons and to investigate their bank accounts, 
income taxes, and other documents. More importantly, section 24 assists 
the CPIB officers investigating corruption cases by requiring those 
accused persons to account for their "pecuniary resources or property" that 
are disproportionate to their known sources of income. 112 
Unlike the British colonial government's weak political will in 
combating corruption, the PAP leaders realized from the outset the critical 
importance of political will by enhancing the CPIB's legal powers and 
providing it with the required personnel and budget to perform its 
functions effectively. The growth in the CPIB's budget and personnel 
from 2008-20 15 is shown in Table 9 and reflected in the increase of its per 
capita expenditure from US$2.32 in 2008 to US$4.87 in 2015. The CPIB's 
staff-population ratio has also improved from I :56,163 to I :23,858 during 
the same period. 
110. CPIB, 111e Journey: 60 rears of Fighting Corn1ption in Singtlpore (Singapore: CPIB. 
2012), p. 18. 
Ill. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to Firs/, the Singapore Storr: /965-2000 
(Singapore: Times Media, 2000), pp. 182-183. 
112. Quah, Curbing Cormplion ill Asian Countries, p. 220. 
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Table 9: CPIB's Budget and Personnel, 2008-2015 
CPIB zoos 2010 2012 2014 2015 
Budget (in millions) US$11.2 US$14.7 US$20.3 US$29.3 US$26.8 
Personnel 86 90 138 205 232 
Per capita US$2.32 US$2.90 US$3.82 US$5.36 US$4.87 
expenditure 
Staff-population mtio 1:56,163 I :56,408 1:38,496 1:26,682 1:23,858 
So11rces: Compiled and calculated by the author from the CPIB's budget and personnel in 
Republic of Singapore, Singapore llrul~et 2008-2016: Amrex to the E.rpentiifllre Estimate.~ 
(Singapore: Budget Division, Ministry of finance, 2008-2016), various pages. 
29 
In addition to its legal powers, adequate personnel and budget, the 
CPIB is an effective Type A ACA for four reasons. First, even though the 
CPIB comes under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office, it has 
operational autonomy because the prime minister and other political 
leaders do not interfere in its daily operations and its director reports to the 
secretary to the cabinet. After the establishment of the Elected Presidency 
in 1991, the CPIB's director can obtain the Elected President's consent to 
investigate allegations of conuption against ministers, members of 
Parliament and senior civil servants if the prime minister withholds his 
consent. 113 As "successive prime ministers and presidents have 
persistently and unequivocally supported and defended" the CPIB's 
impartiality, Gregory contends that "political self-denial by Singapore's 
politicians maintains the agency's de facto independence, which is 
essential for sustaining its reputation for impartiality, and thus its popular 
lcgitimacy." 114 
Second, the CPIB adopts a "total approach to enforcement" and deals 
with both major and minor cases of public and private sector conuption, 
regardless of the amount, rank or status of the persons being investigated. 
The same processes and procedures apply to everyone being investigated, 
including ministers and chief executive oflicers of major companies. 
There is emphasis on both bribe-givers and bribe-takers as they are equally 
culpable according to the POCA. 115 Section 37 of the POCA states that 
Singapore citizens working for their government in embassies and other 
113. Quah, Com hating Corntplimr Singapore-S~1·Jto. pp. 40-4 I. 
114. Robert Gregory, "Political Independence, Operational Impartiality and the 
Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies," Asian J:illlc(lliotl and D<•n:/upme/11 Strtdie.~. 4 (I) 
(20 15): 130-131. 
115. Soh Kee llian, "Corruption Enforcement." (Paper presented at the Second Seminar of 
the International Association of Anti-Corruption Associations, in Chongqing, China. May 17-
18, 2008), pp. 1-2. Soh was the CPIB director from 2005-2010. 
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agencies abroad would be prosecuted for corrupt offenses committed in 
other countries and would be dealt with as if such offenses had occurred 
within Singapore. 1 Jr, The CPIB also investigates anonymous corruption 
complaints if there is sufficient information to initiate an investigation. 
Third, the CPIB's effectiveness can be attributed to its efforts to 
enhance the capabilities of its officers by sending them for training 
programs on management and professional topics in Singapore and 
abroad. It has organized four Anti-Corruption Expertise regional training 
workshops in Singapore on investigation, computer forensics, 
management of A CAs, and cross-border investigation and legal assistance 
for ACA officers in many Asian countries from 2006-2015. In July 2004, 
the CPIB formed a Computer Forensics Unit to enhance the investigative 
and evidence-gathering skills of its officers by providing them with the 
knowledge of forensic accounting to enable them to trace ill-gotten assets 
and retrieve incriminating evidence from seized computers and mobile 
telephones. The CPIB has also conducted joint operations with the 
Commercial Affairs Department and the Immigration and Checkpoints 
Authority to develop networks and partnerships with other public agencies 
in Singapore. 117 
The fourth and most important reason for the CPIB's success is its 
impartial enforcement of the POCA. This means that anyone found guilty 
of a corruption offense is punished regardless of his or her position, status, 
or political affiliation. The CPIB has investigated five PAP leaders and 
eight senior civil servants in Singapore without fear or favor from 1966-
2014. For example, in November 1986, the Minister for National 
Development, TEH Cheang Wan, was accused of accepting S$1 million 
in bribes from two property developers. However, he committed suicide 
one month later before he could be charged in court. The second example 
involved Edwin Yeo, the CPIB's assistant director, who was charged on 
July 24, 2013 with misappropriating US$1.41 million from 2008-2012. He 
was found guilty of criminal breach oftrust and for forgery and sentenced 
to 10 years imprisonment on February 20,2014. 1111 
116. Quah, Curbi11~ Corruption ill Asian Countries. pp. 2211-221. 
117. Soh, "Corruption Enforcement," pp. 3-4. 
Ill!. Jon S.T. Quuh, "Singapore's Cormpt Practices lnvcstigution Bureau: Four Suggestions 
for Enhancing its Effectiveness," Asian l:aucation and De1•elopme111 Studies. 4 (I) (20 I 5): 77, 
l!0-81. 
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B. Hong Kong's Effective Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) 
31 
In 2016, Hong Kong SAR was jointly ranked 15111 with Belgium 
among 176 countries with a CPI score of 77 and was the second least 
corrupt city-state after Singapore. Like Singapore, Hong Kong's success 
can be attributed to the ICAC's effectiveness as reflected in Table I 0, 
which confirms its low extent of perceived corruption, according to eight 
indicators. Corruption was a serious problem in Hong Kong before the 
establishment of the ICAC in February 1974. Bertrand de Spevillc, a 
former ICAC commissioner, observed that "corruption was deeply rooted, 
widespread, generally tolerated and, in some sectors, highly organized." 
All government departments were infected with corruption, especially the 
police, customs and excise service, immigration department, fire and 
ambulance services, and the prison service. Corruption was also a problem 
in the housing, public works, education and health departments. 119 Hong 
Kong provided "a fertile soil for corruption to flourish" because the rapid 
population increase during 1945-1974 severely strained the provision of 
social services and food, housing, water, schools, health care and other 
services were in short supply. Immigrants from mainland China were 
encouraged to pay bribes to the police and other civil servants to avoid 
being harassed by them. The government's monopoly and regulation of 
various activities and the discretion given to those civil servants in charge 
provided many opportunities for corruption. 120 
Table 10: Hong Kong's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016 
Indicator Hone Kone's Performance 
Control of Corruption 1.6 (91.8) 
Corruption Perceptions Index l5'h/l76 (77/100) 
PERC Corruption Survey 4'h/16 (3.40/10) 
Diversion of Public Funds 12'h/138 (5.917) 
Irregular Payments and Bribes 12'h/ 138 ( 6.317) 
Organized Crime 18'h/ 138 ( 6.017) 
Ethical Behavior of Firms J7'h/ 138 ( 5.517) 
Public Trust in Politicians 21''/138 (4.617) 
Srmras: World Bank, "Worldw1de Governance Indicators 20 16"; Transparency 
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; Asian ltuelligence, No. 944, March 
30, 2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), The Global Competitin•ne.u Report '!016-'!017, p. 197. 
119. Bertrand de Spevillc, IIOIIK Kong: Policy lnitiatil•es agaimt Corntption (Paris: 
Development Center, OECD, 1997), p. II. 
120. Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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As Hong Kong was also a British colony, an ACB was established as 
a special unit within the CID of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force 
(RHKPF) in 1948 to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. 121 The 
police was the most corrupt government department122 because the "daily 
extensive contact with the public provided ample opportunity" for 
policemen to be involved in corrupt activities. 123 Police corruption was 
rampant during the early days of the RHKPF because the poorly paid 
policemen supplemented their incomes by accepting bribes from the 
owners of brothels and gambling dens, and the British colonial 
government accorded low priority to crime control and tolerated the 
alliance between the police and the triads. 124 
As part of the ACB's review of the Prevention of Corruption 
Ordinance (POCO), a study team visited Singapore in 1968 to examine 
how its anti-corruption laws worked in practice. The study team was 
impressed with the CPIB's independence and attributed Singapore's 
success in combating corruption to the CPIB's independence from the 
police. 125 The British colonial government in Hong Kong did not support 
the creation of an independent ACA for three reasons: the adverse effects 
on police morale; the difficulties in recruiting and training an independent 
team of expert investigators; and the need for coordination with other 
departments in the RHKPF related to anti-corruption investigations. 12c' 
The RHKPF did not accept the study team's recommendation of 
setting up an independent ACA outside its jurisdiction and suggested 
instead the upgrading of the ACB into the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) 
with the enactment of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) in 
May 1971. 127 The escape of a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent of 
Police, Peter F. Godber, on June 8, 1973 to Britain angered the public in 
Hong Kong and undermined the ACO's credibility. The government 
appointed a Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir Alastair Blair-Kerr to 
121. Kuan Hsin-Chi, "Anti-Comtption legislation in Hong Kong- A History," in Lee (Ed.), 
Cormption and its Control in /long Kong, p. 24. 
122. leslie Palmier, The Cotllro/ of Bureaucratic Cormption: CtlSt' Studies in Asia (New 
Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1985). p. 123. 
123. de Speville, /long Kong. p. 14. 
124. Allan Y. Jiao, The Police in lion~ Kong: :1 Comemporary View (Lanham. MD: 
University Press of America. 2()()7 ), p. 194. 
125. Wong, "The ICAC and its Anti-Comtption Measures," p. 47. 
126. II.J. J.ethhridgc, /lard Graft in /long Kong: Scandal. Corn1ption. the /C4C (llong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, I9M5 ), pp. 99-100. 
127. Ibid .. p. 98. 
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investigate the circumstances that enabled Godber to escape to Britain and 
to evaluate the POBO's effectiveness. 128 
The governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, accepted Sir Alastair's advice 
of considering public opinion and decided for political and psychological 
reasons to establish a new ACA that was independent of the RHKPF. 
Thus, the revelation of Godber's corrupt activities and adverse publicity 
arising from his escape to Britain was the catalyst that made the governor 
accept the risk of removing the RHKPF's control over the investigation of 
corruption. Maclehose's decision was path-breaking because his 
predecessors and previous committees had deferred to the police mainly 
because they feared a collapse of police morale if the control of corruption 
was transferred to an independent ACA. 129 
The lCAC was established on February 15, 1974 with the enactment 
of the ICAC Ordinance to "root out corruption and to restore public 
confidence in the Government."130 MacLehose demonstrated his political 
will in combating corruption by providing the ICAC in 1974 with 369 
personnel and a budget ofHK$16.1 million (US$2.06 million).u 1 He was 
the longest serving governor of Hong Kong from 1971 to 1982 and 
continued to provide "unwavering budgetary support" to the ICAC until 
his retirement. 132 His successors continued to provide the IC AC with 
adequate budget and personnel as, 40 years later, its budget has increased 
by 58 times to HK$937.12 million (US$120.14 million) and its number of 
personnel grew by almost four times to I ,358 in 2014. 133 Table II shows 
that the ICAC's per capita expenditure has increased from US$13.40 in 
2008 to US$17 .24 in 20 15 and its staff-population ratio has also improved 
from I :5,780 to l :5,408 during the same period. 
Table 11: ICAC's Budget and Personnel, 2008-2015 
ICAC 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 
Budget (in US$97.7 US$104.65 US$112.96 US$120.14 US$126.01 
millions) 
128. Quah. Curbing Cormption in Asian Countries. p. 252. 
129. Ibid, pp. 252-253. Sec also Ray Yep, "llle Crusade against Corruption in I long Kong 
in the 1970s: Governor MacLehose as a Zealous Rclonncr or Reluctant llero?" China 
11!formation.17(2) (July 2013): 197-221. 
130. Wong, "The ICAC and its Anti-Corruption Measures." p. 45. 
131. Lethbridge, liard Grc~fi in /long Kong, pp. 107, 231. 
132. Yep. "The Crusade against Corruption in llong Kong in the 1970s," 216. 
133. "Head 72 Independent Commission Against Corruption," ICAC Budget 2014. llong 
Kong, available at: www.budget.gov.hk/2014/eng!pdf/hcad072.pdf (accessed April 29. 2017) 
and ICAC, Annual ReportlOJ.I (Hong Kong: ICAC. 2015), p. 25. 
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Personnel 1,263 1,321 1,282 1,358 1,351 
Per capita US$13.40 US$14.89 US$15.78 US$16.59 US$17.24 
expenditure 
Staff- I :5,780 1:5,317 1:5,581 1:5,333 1:5,408 
population 
ratio 
Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the ICAC's budget and personnel 
from its annual reports and budget from 2008-2015. 
Why has Hong Kong succeeded in minimizing corruption after the 
ICAC's formation in February 1974? A former ICAC commissioner, 
Fanny Law, has identified these strengths ofHong Kong's "sound integrity 
system": a strong political will to curb corruption; a common integrity 
framework for civil servants, politicians, judicial officers, and staff of the 
watchdog agencies; a vibrant civil society with independent media and 
nongovernment organizations; and an independent ICAC with a 
comprehensive anti-corruption program. 134 
Bertrand de Speville, the ICAC commissioner from 1992-1997, has 
attributed the ICAC's effectiveness to five factors. First, the most 
important factor is the government's recognition that corruption is a 
serious problem and its provision of adequate budget and personnel to the 
ICAC to deal with it. Second, to gain public confidence, the ICAC must 
be unimpeachable and its staff "must have unblemished integrity" and be 
"dedicated and effective anti-graft fighters." Third, the ICAC has 
formulated and implemented a carefully designed long-term three-
pronged strategy, which focuses on investigation, prevention, and 
education. Fourth, the ICAC has succeeded in gaining public confidence 
by ensuring that all corruption reports, no matter how small, are 
investigated. Finally, the ICAC is effective because of"a combination of 
factors that collectively produced an advantageous environment in which 
to counter corruption.''135 
In his evaluation of Hong Kong's integrity system, Cheung contends 
that the ICAC's three-pronged strategy of investigation, prevention and 
education has contributed to its success in combating corruption because 
it has (I) inculcated fear among corrupt offenders by enforcing the anti-
corruption laws impartially; (2) reduced the opportunities for corruption 
by streamlining procedures and management processes to prevent 
134. Fanny Law, "The Hong Kong Integrity System," in Leo llubcns, Frank Ancchiarico 
and Frederique Six (Eds.), l.ocal Integrity S.I'StettL~: World Cities Fighting Cor111ptio11 ami 
Safeguarding Integrity (The Hague: Blu Legal Publishers, 200!!), pp. 98-99. 
135. de Spcville, 1/ong Kong. pp. 53, 55-56. 
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corruption; and (3) changed the population's attitudes toward corruption 
through community education and publicity. 136 
In short, the critical factor responsible for the ICAC's success is the 
political will of Hong Kong's government to recognize corruption as a 
problem and its commitment to solve it. De Speville has identified the 
government's decision to tackle the problem of corruption as "the sine qua 
non of effective action." The government must also be willing "to provide 
adequate funding, realising that overcoming corruption will be 
expensivc.''137 
C. South Korea's "Toothless" ACAs 
After his inauguration in February 1998, President KIM Dae-jung 
launched a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy to ensure "clean and 
upright public otlice, transparent and reliable government, and a just and 
fair society" in South Korea. An important target was to improve South 
Korea's ranking on the CPI from 43rt1 position in 1998 to 20th position in 
2003. 138 Using this criterion, Kim's anti-corruption strategy failed 
because South Korea was ranked 50th among 133 countries with a score of 
4.3 in the 2003 CPJ. 139 Similarly, South Korea's weak performance on the 
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) corruption survey was 
reflected in the deterioration of its score of 4.00 in 1995 to 8.33 in 2000. 1 ~0 
Table 12: South Korea's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 
2016 
Indicator South Korea's Performance 
Control of Corruption 0.4 (66.8) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 5200/176 (531100) 
PERC Corruption Survey g•h/16 (6.17/10) 
Diversion of Public Funds 69'h/138 (3.517) 
lrrcJ,!ular Payments and Bribes 5200/138 (4.517) 
Organized Crime 691h/J38 (4.917) 
Ethical Behavior of Firms 981h/J38 (3.517) 
136. Anthony B.l. Cheung. "Evaluation of lhe llong Kong Integrity System." in lluberts. 
Anechiarico and Six ( Eds. ). l..oca/lmegrity .~rstems. p. I 06. 
137. de Speville,l/ong Kong. p. 71. 
138. Republic of Korea, Korea's Comprehensiw Anti-Comtption J>ro~rams (Seoul: Office 
of the Prime Minister, 1999), p. 6. 
139. From 1995-2011, lhe CPI score ranged from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). 
However, from 2012, the CPI score was changed to 0 (highly corrupt) lo I 00 (very clean). 
140. Quah, C11rbing Corn~ption in Asian Cowllries, p. 338. The PERC corruption survey 
score ranges from 0 (lt..'3st corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt). 
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Public Trust in Politicians 96'h/ 138 (2.517) 
Souret!.f: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Transparency 
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; Asian Intelligence. No. 944, March 
30,2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), 111e Global Competith·eness Report20/6-2017, p. 225. 
Table 12 confirms that corruption is still a serious problem in South 
Korea according to the eight indicators in 2016, including the CPI and 
PERC corruption survey in 2016. Its percentile rank for the World Bank's 
Control of Corruption indicator is 66.8 and its ranking for the other five 
indicators range from 52"d among 138 countries for Irregular Payments 
and Bribes to 98111 among 138 countries for Ethical Behavior of Finns in 
2016. 
South Korea's failure to curb corruption effectively can be attributed 
to its government's weak political will, the low risk of detecting and 
punishing corruption offenses, and the population's tolerance for corrupt 
practices like gift-giving and paying chonji or bribe money. The South 
Korean government's weak political will in curbing corruption is reflected 
in the creation of the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(KICAC) on January 25, 2002 and its replacement by the Anti-Corruption 
and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) on February 29, 2008. 
Originally, the draft legislation initiated by the People's Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy and supported by other civil society 
organizations proposed the establishment of the KICAC based on Hong 
Kong's ICAC. The KICAC's formation met with stiff resistance in the 
National Assembly and was also opposed by the Public Prosecutor's 
Office (PPO) and the National Police Agency (NPA) because both 
agencies wanted to perform the anti-corruption function themselves. 141 
However, the lack of freedom of the PPO and NPA from the president's 
influence has hindered "neutral law enforcement." 142 Consequently, the 
Anti-Corruption Act's enactment on July 24, 2001 resulted in the 
KICAC's formation as a "poor cousin" of the ICAC because it could not 
investigate corruption cases. 143 
The KICAC's inability to investigate corruption cases was its 
Achilles' heel and meant that it was not a full-fledged Type A ACA 
because it could not perform the primary function of investigating 
141. Ibid., p. 330. 
142. Jin-Wook Choi. "Anti-Corruption and Governance," in Ambar Widaningrum and Jin 
Park (Eds.), G01·ernance am/ Reform in lndotlt'sia and Korea: A Comparatiw Perspectiw 
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2011 ), p. 43. 
143. Jon S.T. Quah, "Defying Institutional Failure: learning from the Experiences of Anti-
Corruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries," Crime, Low and Soda/ Change. 53 (I) (20 I 0): 
41-42. 
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corruption cases and focused instead on the other functions of corruption 
prevention and education. The KICAC was only responsible for dealing 
with public sector corruption but not private sector corruption. Its anti-
corruption functions were further diluted by President LEE Myung-bak 
when he merged the KICAC with the Ombudsman and Administrative 
Appeals Commission in February 2008 to form the ACRC in order to 
enhance their effectiveness. 144 However, the ACRC's creation, which 
resulted from the merger of three agencies with "weak functional 
relevancy and coherence," has blurred its anti-corruption role. 145 
The ACRC has also inherited the KICAC's weaknesses because it 
cannot investigate corruption cases and focuses only on public sector 
corruption. Its stated objective was to improve its eflectiveness. However, 
the unintended (or intended?) consequence of the KICAC's merger with 
the Ombudsman and Administrative Appeals Commission is the dilution 
of the emphasis given by the previous governments to combating 
corruption by according lower priority to this objective. The ACRC's 
establishment by President Lee reflected his weak political will in 
combating corruption as Table 13 confirms the marginal increase in the 
ACRC's per capita expenditure from US$0.97 to US$1.15 during 2008-
2014 and its highly unfavorable staff-population ratios during the same 
period. 
Table 13: ACRC's Budget and Personnel, 2008-2014 
ACRC 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Budget (in millions) US$47.6 US$51.05 US$55.1 US$58.3 
Personnel 466 466 465 465 
Per capita expenditure US$0.97 US$1.03 US$1.10 US$1.15 
Staff-population ratio 1:105.021 1:106,030 I: 107.527 I: I 08,430 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the ACRC's budget and personnel. 
Corruption flourishes in those countries where it is perceived as a 
"low risk, high reward" activity because offenders arc unlikely to be 
caught and punished. On the other hand, corruption is not a serious 
problem where it is perceived as a "high risk. low reward" activity as those 
involved in corrupt activities are likely to be caught and severely 
144. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries. p. 334. 
145. Jin-Wook Choi. "Institutional Structures and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption 
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea and Hong Kong," Asian Joumal cJ{ l'olitical 
Science,/7(2)(2009):209. 
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punished. 146 Corruption in South Korea is a "low risk, high reward" 
activity because of the lenient punishment received by those found guilty 
of corruption offenses. The ACRC's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Survey 
found that "lenient punishment for corruption" was identified as an 
important cause of corruption in South Korea by 24.1 percent of citizens, 
21 percent of opinion leaders, 18 percent of business persons, 14.5 percent 
of foreign residents, and 12.9 percent of public servants. 147 
Table 14: Punishment of South Korean Public Officials 
for Corruption Offenses, 1993-2004 
TypeofCase Guilty Verdict Served actual Suspended 
prison Sentences 
sentence 
Corruption case 131 41 (31.3%) 90 (68.7%) 
Aggravated crimes 62 13 (21.0%) 49 (79.0%) 
below 
50 m. won 
Aggravated crimes over 35 17 (48.6%) 18 (51.4%) 
50 m. won 
Aggravated crimes total 97 30 (31.0%) 67 (69.0%) 
SourCt': Joongi Kim, "The Judiciary's Role in Good Governance in Korea," in M. Ramesh 
and Scott Fritzen (Eds.), 1hm.iforming Asian Gtll'ernance: Rethinking Assumptions. 
Challenging Practices (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 147. 
According to the law, those persons found guilty of accepting bribes 
exceeding 50 million won (US$50,000) would be imprisoned for longer 
than I 0 years, while those who had accepted bribes between 10 million 
won and 50 million won (US$10,000 to US$50,000) would be jailed for 
more than five years. However, in reality, the courts are unusually lenient 
and do not impose the stricter sentences required by the law. Table 14 
shows that for the 35 guilty public officials who accepted bribes exceeding 
50 million won, only 17 (48.6 percent) were imprisoned and 18 (51.4 
percent) received suspended sentences. Thus, more than halfofthe public 
oflicials found guilty of grand corruption were not punished for their 
misconduct. 
The second reason why corruption is also a "low risk, high reward" 
activity in South Korea is that those found guilty of corruption offenses 
are not punished severely as they can be pardoned by the president. Former 
President CHUN Doo-hwan was sentenced by the Seoul district court in 
146. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Cmmtrit·.~. p. 18. 
147. ACRC. A11ti-Corruptio11 Atmual Report !OOH (Seoul: ACRC. 2009), p. 21. 
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August 1996 to death for mutiny, treason and corruption. His successor, 
former President ROH Tae-woo, was sentenced to 22.5 years' 
imprisonment on similar charges. Both Chun and Roh were tined US$270 
million and US$350 million, respectively. However, in December 1997, 
President KIM Young-sam granted amnesty to both of them after serving 
only 16 months in jail. 148 
President LEE Myung-bak granted special pardons on January 29, 
2013 to 55 persons who were imprisoned for bribery. Among those 
pardoned were Lee's confidant and former minister, CHOI See-joong; his 
friend and businessman, CHUN Shin-it; former parliamentary speaker, 
PARK Hee-tae; and his former political affairs aide. This latest round was 
the seventh time that Lee exercised his right to pardon guilty offenders 
during his term of office.wl Consequently, he was criticized for "using 
pardons to let offfriends and family at the end of one's presidency [which] 
is more than shameless- it is a deliberate insult to the Korean people."150 
Culture contributes to corruption when traditional practices like gift-
giving and family ties influence individuals to give or receive bribes, and 
make them tolerate corrupt practices. The ACRC's 2008 Corruption 
Perceptions Survey also found that the "social culture tolerant of 
corruption" was identified as another important cause of corruption by 
34.5 percent of foreign residents, 28.4 percent of opinion leaders, 25 
percent of business persons, 23 percent of citizens and 19.6 percent of 
public servants. 151 In South Korea, gitl-giving contributes to corruption 
because an expensive gift is a bribe if it is given to an important individual 
in order to receive a favor. Chonji is a way of life in South Korea as 
mothers give chonji to teachers to ensure that their children do well at 
school, young lecturers get jobs at colleges by paying chm~;;, and drivers 
pay clwnji to avoid speeding tickets. Small businesses give cho11ii 
frequently to those civil servants demanding money in exchange for every 
stage of administrative action related to their trade. 152 Rich persons and 
large companies also pay chmyi for the services and cooperation provided 
by civil servants. 
This "deeply entrenched custom" is practised by government 
ministers and agencies that pay clwnji to journalists and editors for 
148. Quah, Curbing Cormptimr in Asian Countri<•s, p. 324. 
149. "South Korean leader pardons ex-aides." Stmits 7/mes, January 30, 2013. 
150. C.ll. Aim, "President Lee's corrupt relatives and associates could be pardoned," 
Hanykyol'<'lt. January I 0, 2013. 
151. ACRC, Anti-Corn1ptio11 Atmual Report 2008. p. 21. 
152. B.S. Kim, "Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policies in Korea," Korea Joumal. 38 (I) 
( 1998): 53. 
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favorable coverage of their activities. The "chonji system makes the 
various government offices hostage to the reporters who cover them" 
because reporters write critical articles about government officials if they 
"fail to hand over acceptable amounts." Press coverage of scandals 
committed by public officials is "frequently linked to the failure of 
officials to hand over enough clwnji to ensure a cover-up." Senior 
executives of major corporations usually pay reporters chm~ji of one 
million won for a favorable interview. 153 
As South Korean business persons, politicians and senior government 
officials frequently host dinner banquets, give expensive presents during 
holidays, and make cash donations at weddings and funerals, these 
practices reinforce the culture of collusion and pose serious corruption 
risks because it is difficult to distinguish gifts from bribes. After many 
years of debate, the National Assembly passed the Improper Solicitation 
and Graft Act on March 3, 2015, which would imprison those journalists, 
teachers and civil servants for up to three years for accepting single cash 
donations or gifts worth more than one million won. 154 
On May 9, 2016 the ACRC announced that the Improper Solicitation 
and Graft Act would be implemented on September 28, 2016, This law 
prohibits the acceptance of a gift worth 50,000 won (US$42.85) or 
receiving more than 100,000 won (US$85.70) in cash for a wedding or 
funeral; the acceptance of a gift worth more than one million won 
(US$857) or accumulated gifts worth more than three million won 
(US$2,571) a year; and public officials, journalists and teachers from 
being treated to a meal by their job-related contacts if the meal costs more 
than 30,000 won (US$25.71). 155 However, critics ofthis law contend that 
the "tough limits on accepting meals and gifts" may have adverse effects 
on the economy. 156 Nevertheless, the enactment of the Improper 
Solicitation and Graft Act in March 20 15 and its implementation in 
September 2016 would reduce the South Koreans' tolerance for corrupt 
practices if the new gift-giving regulations are enforced impartially by the 
public agencies. 
Corruption can be minimized if South Koreans abhor corruption and 
do not tolerate corrupt practices by anyone. This means that no one is 
above the law and anyone found guilty of corruption offenses is punished 
153. Boye Lafayette de Mente. Korean Etiquette and Ethics in Busines.~. 2nd edition 
(Lincolnwood, IL: NTC Business Books, 1994), p. 30. 
154. "South Korea passes anti-graft law," Straits 1'imt•s, March 5, 2015, p. A 13. 
155. M.J. Ser, "Graft law targets monetary gifts," Korea JoongAng Dai(l'. May 10,2016. 
156. "Backlash against S. Korea's strict anti-corruption law," Straits Timt•s. May 28,2016, 
p. A26. 
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according to the law, without special treatment or amnesty granted by the 
president. If corrupt leaders and public officials are leniently punished for 
committing corrupt acts and pardoned by the president, it would be 
difficult to encourage South Koreans to avoid corruption if these corrupt 
individuals are not punished severely tor their misconduct. 
On August 25, 2017, LEE Jae-yong, Vice-Chairman of Samsung 
Electronics, was sentenced to five years' jail for bribing then President 
PARK Geun-hye to ensure Lee's control of the chaebol that owns his 
company. 157 Lee's imprisonment indicates that Samsung is no longer 
"untouchable" and that South Koreans would no longer provide business 
leaders "political immunity in exchange for untrammeled economic 
growth."158 However, it remains to be seen whether President MOON Jae-
inn, who was elected on May 9, 2017, has the political will to keep his 
electoral promise to end the practice of pardoning those corporate tycoons 
who arc found guilty of corruption offenses. 
IV. COMBATING CORRUPTION WITH MANY 
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES 
"Too many cooks spoil the broth. .. 
English idiom 159 
Among the 13 barriers to coordination identi tied by Peters, 
"defending the organization's 'turf" or "the things that the organization 
holds dear and may perceive as threatened by other organizations, such as 
money, space, and time"160 is perhaps the most important reason for the 
competition and lack of coordination among the multiple A CAs in China, 
India, and Philippines. This section explains why the reliance on multiple 
ACAs in these three countries is ineffective in curbing corruption. Table 
15 provides details ofthe ACAs in the three countries. 
157. "Samsung heir Lee Jac-yong sentenced to 5 years' jail for bribery," Chmmel Nt'll~v.·l.via. 
August 25.2017. 
158. Choe Sang-Hun, Jcyup S. Kwaak and Paul Mozur, "Samsung verdict sends <t tough 
new message to South Korea Inc.," New York 17mes, August 25.2017. 
159. The meaning of this idiom is: "where there arc too many people trying to do something, 
they make a mess of it." Sec "Idiom: Too many cooks spoil the broth" at: 
https://www.usingenglish.com/rcfcrcncc/idioms/too+many+cooks+spoil+thc+broth.html 
(accessed May 26, 2017). 
160. B. Guy Peters, Pursuing Horizontal Managemelll: 71w /'o/itics of' Public Sector 
Coordination (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), p. 32. 
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Table 15: Reliance on Multiple ACAs in Three Asian Countries 
Countn· Anti-Corruotlon Al!eoc:les 
China Central Commission for Discipline lnspt:etion (lead ACA). Ministry of 
Supervision. Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
National Corruotion Prevention Bureau 
India Central Bureau of Investigation (lead AC A). Centml Vigilance 
Commission. Anti-Corruption Bureall~ and State Vigilance Commissions in 28 
States 
Philippines Office of the Ombudsman (lead ACA). Sancliganbayan (Special Anti-Gran 
Coun), Presidential Commission on Good Government, Inter-Agency Anti-
Corruption Coordinating Council, Ollice of the Deputy Secretary for Legal 
Affairs 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
A. China's Flawed ACAs 
Table 16 shows that China has a high level of perceived extent of 
corruption according to eight corruption indicators in 2016. While China's 
score on the PERC survey has worsened from 7.3 in 1995 to 7.5 in 2016, 
its CPI score has increased from 21.6 to 40 during the same period. 161 
However, corruption remains an intractable and "maddingly resilient" 
problem in China today in spite of its reliance on multiple A CAs and anti-
corruption campaigns. 162 
Table 16: China's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016 
Indicator China's Performance 
Control ofCorruotion -0.3 (49.0) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 79'"1176 (40/100) 
PERC Corruption Survey 11'"116 (7.5/1 0) 
Diversion of Public Funds 44'"1138 (4.117) 
Irregular Payments and Bribes 54'"1138 (4.317) 
Organized Crime 78'"1138 (4.717) 
Ethical Behavior of Firms 52'1d/ 138 ( 4.117) 
Public Trust in Politicians 30'11/138 (4.2/7) 
Source.~: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016": Tmnsparency 
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016": Asian lntelli~e/lce. No. 944, March 
30,2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), 71w Global Competitil•ent•.u Rt•port20/6-2017, p. 147. 
161. Jon S.T. Quah, "Singapore's Success in Combating Corruption: Four lessons for 
China," American Joumal of Chinese Smclit•s. 23 (2) (2016): 196. 
I 62. Robert lawrence Kuhn, /loll' China:~ Lemler.~ Think: The lnsid(· Story of Chinas Past, 
Current unci 1-"ufllre Leaders. Revised edition (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Asia. 2011 ), p. 
I NO. 
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1. Reliance 011 Multiple A CAs 
As the four ACAs in China employ a sectoral approach in 
investigating corruption, the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (CCDI), which is the lead ACA, and the Discipline Inspection 
Commissions (DICs) are responsible for disciplining those members of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) accused of corruption offenses. Those 
found guilty of disciplinary offenses, including corruption, are punished 
according to the severity of their offenses. 163 However, the CCDI was 
criticized for protecting party cadres who were under investigation by 
shielding them in "a safe nest" and exempting them from criminal 
punishment. IM Among the 115, I 43 CCP members disciplined during 
1992-2006, 44,836 (38.9 percent) were warned, and 32,289 (28 percent) 
of them were given a serious warning. Thus, two-thirds of those party 
members who were disciplined "got away with only a mild to serious 
warning that appeared to have no real punitive conscqucnccs."165 
The CCP has treated its corrupt members leniently because of the 
political tradition of not imposing them with the legal penalty to avoid 
embarrassing the CCP and government and prevent the erosion of ofiicial 
authority. Thus, instead of punishing high-ranking officials, which is 
shameful and threatens the authority of the CCP and government, the 
preferred option is to rely on "internal resolution." Not surprisingly. 
corrupt party officials believe that they would unlikely be caught and 
punished. 166 
As not all party officials who arc suspected of corruption and 
investigated in China are convicted, there are three reasons why some 
corrupt officials are punished less severely. First, those corrupt officials 
who are cooperative, make voluntary confessions, provide information on 
other corrupt officials, and return illegal income to the government, arc 
punished less severely. Second, some corrupt officials receive less harsh 
punishment depending on the definition of the amount of money 
163. These punishments include a waming, serious waming, demotion from duty, expulsion 
from the CCP with il two-year prob01tion period, or expulsion from the CCP 01nd transfer to the 
judicial system for those accused of accepting bribes exceeding 5,000 yuan. Sec Flom Sapio, 
Implementing A11ti-Cormptio11 i11 the I'RC: l'aflems of Se/ectil'it)' (Lund: Center for East and 
Southeast Asi01n Studies, Lund University. Working Paper No. 10. 2005), pp. 8 and 10. 
164. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
165. Minx in Pci, "Fighting Corruption: A Difficult Challenge for Chinese Leaders," in 
Cheng Li (Ed.), Chi11a 's Cha11~inR Politicall.tmc/.w·ape: ProspectsfiJI' Democraq• (Washinr,ton. 
IJC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 230-232. 
I 66. Lening Zhang, "White-Collar Crime: Bribery and Com1ption in China." in Jianhong 
l.iu, Lcning Zhang and Steven F. Messner (Ed~.), Crime a11<l !>"ucial Control in China ( Wcstpon, 
CT: Greenwood Press. 200 I), pp. 28 and 33. 
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embezzled or bribes received. Third, when there are too many corrupt 
officials, only seriously corrupt officials are punished but the less corrupt 
officials are exempted from punishment in order to avoid paralyzing the 
operations of the city or local government. Indeed, "when the number of 
corrupt agents becomes too high, curbing corruption becomes too difficult, 
if not impossible."1c'7 The inconsistencies in investigating and punishing 
corrupt officials at both the central and local levels in China have 
undermined the credibility of the disciplinary agencies and encouraged the 
belief among the officials that they would unlikely be punished for 
corruption offenses. 1c'8 
The Ministry of Supervision (MOS) was dissolved in 1959 but was 
restored by the Standing Committee of the 6'h National People's Congress 
in December 1986 to curb corruption in the civil service. 16'' It is 
responsible for checking "all contracts signed with foreign interests for 
any indications of 'corruption' -from failure to provide for compensation 
within legal limits to undercover arrangements that amount to bribery."170 
The MOS also receives and investigates complaints about civil servants 
and personnel of state administrative departments violating administrative 
procedures. The CCDI and MOS have their counterparts at the provincial, 
municipal and county levels. As most civil servants are also CCP 
members, the MOS and CCDI merged in January 1993 after working 
together for six years. Nevertheless, both ACAs have retained their 
separate organizational identities, with the MOS being responsible for the 
control of administrative punishment in State Council organs and the 
CCDI focusing instead on the punishment of the CCP members. 171 
The Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) was re-established in 
1978 to combat judicial corruption. Anti-corruption efforts in the SPP 
were institutionalized after the Tiananmen anti-corruption and democracy 
movement in 1989 with the establishment of the Procuratorial Division of 
Graft and Bribery, the Bureau for Embezzlement and Bribery of the 
People's Procuratorate, and the General Bureau of Anti-Corruption. 172 In 
December 1995, the SPP further strengthened its capacity by creating an 
16 7. Yongshun Cai, ,\'tate and Agents in China: Disciplining Gowmmelll Qflicials 
(Sianford, CA: Stanford University l'rcss, 2015), pp. 130-131. 
168. Ibid .• p. 133. 
169. Stephen K. Ma, "The IJual Nature of Anti-Corruption Agcnc1es 111 China," Cnme. I .all' 
and Social Change. 49 (2) (March 2008): 154. 
170. Boyc Lufuyctlc De 1\.lcntc, 71w Chill<'·"' Way ill /Jusill<'ss: 17w Sccr<•ls ilj Surrl'<~fil/ 
Business Dealings in China (Tokyo: Tuttle l'ublishing, 2013), p. 99. 
171. David Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washinglon, 
IJC: Woodrow Wilson Ccnler Press, 2001!), pp. 132-133. 
172. Ma, "The Dual Nalure of Anti-Comtption Agencies in China," 154. 
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Anti-Corruption and Anti-Bribery General Office and similar offices at the 
provincial level in 28 provincial procuratorates and at the municipal level 
in nearly 300 municipal procuratorates. m 
Unlike the CCDI, MOS and SPP, which focus on the investigation 
and prosecution of corruption ofTenses among public oflicials, the 
National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB) was formed on 
September 13, 2007 as China's fourth ACA to implement preventive 
measures, monitor the transfer of assets across the organizations, facilitate 
and promote information sharing between agencies, and police corrupt 
practices among private enterprises, social organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations. This means that the NCPB focuses on 
corruption prevention and private sector corruption, which arc not dealt 
with by the CCDI, SPP and MOS. The NCPB is located within the MOS 
and consists of 30 personnel drawn from the MOJ, the Supreme People's 
Court and the SPP. 174 
The CCDI, MOS and SPP arc ineffective ACAs because the "limited 
coordination between the three agencies, a lack of timely, actionable 
information, and narrow oversight capabilities all hinder anti-corruption 
work."175 However, the NCPB cannot enhance coordination and facilitate 
cooperation among the ACAs in China because apart from its limited 
independence and minimal enforcement capabilities, its creation has 
increased complexity instead of improving coordination. The NCPB is in 
"a highly untenable position" because it lacks the power to enforce its 
mandate of coordinating the work of the ACAs.m' The NCPB 's creation 
is "symbolic" as it cannot investigate individual cases of corruption. 177 
2. Reliance on Anti-Cormption Campaigns 
Apart from relying on the four ACAs to implement the anti-
corruption laws and regulations, the CCP also employs anti-corruption 
campaigns to enhance their enforcement. In China, a mass campaign is "a 
series of organized, planned actions for a particular purpose, usually 
173. Jon S.T. Quah, Hunting the Corntpt "Tigers" and "Flies" in China: An Emluation of 
Xi Jinping 's Ami-Cormption Campaign (NtJ\'ember 2012 to March 20/5) (Balli more. MD: 
Carey School of Law. University of Maryland. 20 15). p. 27. 
174. Jefficy Becker. "Tackling Com1ption at its Source: The National Com~ption Prevention 
Bureau," Joumal of Chinese l'o/itical Science, 13 (3) (2008): 291. 
175. Ibid., 287. 
176. Ibid., 297-299. 
177. Chen Gang and Zhu Jinjing, "China's Recent Clampdown on lligh-Stakcs Com1ption." 
EA/ /Jackgrowul /Jrief. No. 490 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of 
Singapore, November 19, 2009), p. 13. 
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involving the mobilization of a large number of people to engage in highly 
visible, intensive, and concentrated activities." t78 The anti-corruption 
campaigns in China during the 1980s and 1990s were anti-corruption 
struggles (fan .fubai douzheng) characterized by enhanced publicity to 
encourage the public to report corruption and corrupt officials to confess 
their misconduct, and the demand by the political leaders to increase the 
enforcement of the anti-corruption measures. t79 
In November 2012, President XI Jinping launched the most intensive 
anti-corruption campaign to eliminate the "tigers and flies" or those senior 
and junior officials who had become rich through bribery and patronage. 
This campaign focuses on these aspects: (I) grassroots level where 
whistle-blowers and netizens use social media to expose low-ranking 
corrupt officials: (2) corrupt officials below the county and department 
levels; (3) private sector corruption; and ( 4) corruption as a weapon in 
factional infighting among the CCP leaders.tso More importantly, Xi's 
campaign curbs the Chinese officials' extravagance on the three public 
expenses on vehicles, banquets, and overseas trips or sangong xial?fei, 
which has generated a great deal of public criticism. The "Eight 
Directives" (baxiang guiding) to streamline the bureaucracy and curb 
waste and extravagance were approved by the CCP Politburo on 
December 4, 20 12 and implemented in the provinces and municipalities 
from January 2013.tst 
Xi's anti-corruption campaign also relies on inspection teams 
(xunshizu) which are sent across China to investigate corruption in 
corruption-prone provinces, ministries, state corporations and public 
agencies. The CCDI sent 20 inspection teams across the country in 2013, 
followed by another 26 inspection teams in 2014.t 82 In addition, the CCDI 
has stationed 53 DICs in 48 leadership bodies among the ministries and 
agencies of the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, the SPP, and 
17X. Alan P.L. Liu. "Mass Campaigns and Political Development in China," Currml ScL"ne. 
11 (8) (August 1973 ): I. 
179. Melanic Manion, Cormption 1~1· Design: Building Clean Gm•emment in Mainland 
China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. I 61. 
IHO. Andrew Wcdeman, "Xi Jinping's Tiger llunt and the Politics of Corruption" China 
Research, 13 (2) (October 15, 2014): 204. 
181. Shi Jiangtao, "Xi Jinping's guiddincs to cut back extravagance go into effect," South 
China Morning l'o.vt. January 4, 2013. 
182. Chen Gang, ''The 'Tigers' in Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign," EAI 
Backwormd /Jriel No. 933 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 
June 30, 2014), p. 9 and Chen Gang, "Wang Qishan and China's Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection," £A1 Jlackground /Jrief. No. 1012 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, 
National University of Singapore, April 2. 2015). pp. 16-17. 
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major state-owned enterprises. IMJ The campaign has resulted in the 
investigation of 74 civilian "tigers" or officials of vice-ministerial rank or 
above and 30 military "tigers" in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
from November 2012 to May 2015. 184 Furthermore, over 180,000 CCP 
members and government ofticials, 74 provincial level ofticials, 4,024 
PLA ofticers (including 82 generals), and 68 ministerial and vice-
ministerial ofticials were investigated and punished during 2013-2014. 185 
However, in spite of the large numbers of party members and 
government otlicials being investigated and punished for corruption 
offenses, Xi's anti-corruption campaign is ineffective for three reasons. 
First, the Achilles' heel of Xi's campaign is that it has treated the 
symptoms of corruption instead of addressing its five causes in China. The 
campaign has focused only on discouraging the cultural practices of 
guanxi (connections) and gift-giving by curbing official extravagance on 
the three public expenses of cars, banquets, and overseas trips. In addition 
to the "Eight Directives", the State Council issued on November 25,2013 
a regulation that banned all government agencies from using public funds 
to organize galas. This was followed by another regulation in December 
2013 that removed shark's fin soup, bird's nest soup and wild animal 
products from the menu and prohibited the provision of free cigarettes and 
expensive liquor at official dinners. 1Mb Xi himself set an example by having 
a simple dinner of "four dishes and a soup" during his official visit to 
Fuping county in Hebei Province in late December 2012. 187 The State 
Council circulated on December 18, 2013 guidelines for "funeral and 
internment reform" to ensure that CCP members and officials set an 
example for others by having "simple, civilized funerals without 
monumental gravestones, fireworks and the practice of collecting gifts 
(bribes)." 188 
This means that the other four causes of low salaries of officials, red 
tape, low probability of detection and punishment of corruption offenders, 
and discretion of local officials without accountability, are not addressed 
183. Cheng Li. Chinese Polilics in lhe Xi Jinpin~ l:'ra: Rea.,·sessin~ Co/lecliW! Leadership 
(Washington. DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2016). p. 41!. 
184. Quah, Hunting 1he Corntpl "Tiger.~" and "Hie.~ .. in China. pp. 41-54. 
185. David Shambaugh, China's Fwure (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 2016), p. 119. 
186. J.T. Quigley, "No more Shark's Fin Soup and Bird's Nest Soup at CCP Banquets," The 
l>iplomal. December 9, 2013. 
I 1!7. Brian Spegclc, "Xi cats plainly amid focus on official waistlines," Wall S1ree1 Joumal. 
December 31,2012. 
188. Christina Larson, "China's anti-gran campaign bans luxury funerals." Bloomberg 
Business. December 20, 2013. 
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by the CCP. 189 Corruption in China cannot be minimized unless the CCP 
also initiates appropriate measures to deal with these causes. This 
limitation of Xi's campaign was indicated by WANG Qishan, the CCDI's 
Secretary, in October 2014 when he admitted that "it's necessary to 
address the symptoms of corruption before treating its root causes. " 1911 
Shambaugh also observes that Xi's campaign targets "the behavioral 
manifestations of corruption (bribery, private villas, lavish lifestyles, 
luxury goods, mistresses)" but "not the systemic sources of corruption 
(lack of transparency, lack of autonomous media, lack of autonomous 
judiciary, rent-seeking, slack auditing and tax systems, and lack of 
political competition)."1'JI In short, after almost five years, Xi's campaign 
is still focusing on the symptoms of corruption without treating the other 
four causes. 
Second, Xi's anti-corruption campaign is ineffective because of the 
selective enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the four ACAs. 
Unlike Singapore's CPIB, which has enforced the POCA impartially, the 
CCP enforces the anti-corruption laws selectively by protecting its corrupt 
members by handing them over to the CCDI to discipline them internally 
within the Party instead of transferring them to the SPP for criminal 
investigation and prosecution. However, not all the corrupt officials are 
protected by the CCP, especially those who are viewed to be political 
opponents by the CCP leaders. Xi's campaign is described as "a selective 
purge" because "many members of JIANG Zemin's factional network, and 
a rising number of HU Jintao's, have been brought down-yet none of 
Xi's own princeling associates have been touched."192 Thus, the acid test 
of the impartiality of Xi's anti-corruption campaign would be the 
investigation and prosecution of all "tigers and flies," regardless of their 
political affiliation or membership of factions within the CCP. 
The third reason for the ineffectiveness of Xi's campaign is the CCP 
leaders' reliance on corruption as a weapon against their political 
opponents, as reflected in the persecution of CHEN Xitong, CHEN 
Liangyu, BO Xilai and ZHOU Yongkang from 1995 to 2014. These four 
party leaders were prosecuted not only for their corruption offenses but, 
more importantly, because they posed a threat to the consolidation of 
power of Presidents JIANG Zemin, HU Jintao and XI Jinping, 
189. For an analysis of these causes, sec Jon s:r. Quah, Minimizing Corruption in China: Is 
this all Impossible Dream? (Baltimore, MD: Carey School of Law, University of Law, 
University of Maryland, 2013 ), pp. 41-58. 
190. Sun Xiaobo, "Institutionalizing anti-corntption a vital task," Global Times, October 19, 
2014. 
191. Shambaugh, China's f'uture, p. 120. 
192. Ibid., pp. I 19-120. 
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respectively. China is not unique in using the CCDI as an attack dog 
against the CCP leaders' political foes because "the tendency to use 
corruption to settle political scores is widespread" in Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam too. 193 
Thus, Xi's anti-corruption campaign is ineiTective because it fails to 
address the causes of corruption, the eCDI enforces the anti-corruption 
laws selectively by protecting corrupt ecp members from criminal 
investigation and prosecution, and the CCP leaders usc the CCDI as an 
attack dog against their political opponents. Even if President Xi continues 
his anti-corruption campaign until the end of his ten-year term of office in 
November 2022, the corrupt "tigers" and "flies" would resume business 
as usual the next day as though the campaign had not occurred at all 
because the incentives and opportunities for corruption persist in China 
and would prove to be irresistible to them once again. In short, "without 
tackling the underlying causes of corruption, no anti-corruption campaign, 
no matter how long it lasts or how intensive it is, can minimize the 
systemic corruption in China." 194 
B. India's Ineffective ACAs 
Unlike China, India is a democracy and was a former British colony. 
However, unlike Hong Kong and Singapore, India has not benefitted from 
the legacy of British colonial rule and has failed to curb corruption because 
of the Jack of political will of its governments and their continued reliance 
on ineffective and poorly resourced Type B ACAs. The Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) arc the 
most important ACAs in India, with the CBI as the lead ACA. As India is 
a sub-continent and the seventh largest country in the world with a land 
area of 3,287,263 sq. km, 1<)5 the CBI and eve rely on a vast network in 
the 28 states with their own anti-corruption bureaus (ACBs) and state 
vigilance commissions (SVCs) to deal, respectively, with anti-corruption 
and vigilance work, but the ACBs derive their powers of investigation 
from the Police Act because they are regular police units. The CBI has 16 
zones and 60 branches, with each state having at least a branch or unit at 
the state capital or a major city. The SVes arc patterned after the eve and 
193. Dini Djalal, "Southeast Asia," in Robin llodcss (Ed.). Global Cormpticm Report !00/ 
(Berlin: Transparency International. 2001 ), pp. 32-33. 
194. Quah. H11111ing the Corntpt .. Tigers·· m1d .. F/i<•s ··in China. p. 96. 
195. Economist, Pocket World in Figures !0/6 Edition, pp. 14, 156. 
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are assisted by the ACBs in conducting investigations of corruption by 
public servants.•% 
The high level of perceived extent of corruption in India is reflected 
in its weak perfonnance on the eight indicators shown in Table 17. India's 
low percentile rank of 4 7.1 in 20 I 6 for the control of corruption is 
confirmed by its 79'11 ranking among 176 countries on the CPI in 20 16, and 
its last position on the 2016 PERC corruption survey. Similarly, the other 
five indicators in The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-201 7 show 
that there arc high levels of diversion of public funds, irregular payments 
and bribes, and organized crime; and low levels of ethical behavior of 
finns, and public trust in politicians. 
Table 17: India's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016 
Indicator India's Performance 
Control of Corruption -0.3 (47.1) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 791h/J76 (40/100) 
PERC Corruption Survey 16111/16 (8.13/10) 
Diversion of Public Funds 34111/138 (4.517) 
Irregular Payments and Bribes 49111/138 ( 4.517) 
Organized Crime 97111/138 (4.317) 
Ethical Behavior of Firms 3 71h/J38 ( 4.517) 
Public Trust in Politicians 31"1138 (4.217) 
Sources: World Bank. "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Transparency 
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016": Asia11 lmelligellce, No. 944, March 
30,2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), The Global Competitiwress Report 20/6-20/7, p. 203. 
Corruption was made an offense in the Indian Penal Code in 1860 but 
India's battle against corruption only began with the creation of the Delhi 
Special Police Establishment (DSPE) in 1941 to "investigate cases of 
bribery and corruption in transactions" involving the War and Supply 
Departments because the tremendous increase in expenditure during the 
early stages of the Second World War provided many opportunities for 
corruption. 1''7 The CBI was established by the Government oflndia (GOI) 
in April 1963 by incorporating the DSPE as the Investigation and Anti-
Corruption Division with five other divisions. The CBI perfonns these 
functions: (I) combating public sector corruption and curbing economic 
and violent crimes through investigation and prosecution; (2) ensuring 
"effective systems and procedures for successful investigation and 
prosecution of cases in various law courts"; (3) fighting cyber and high 
196. Qua h. Curbillf.! Corruptioll ill Asia11 Coumries. p. 97. 
197. Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
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technology crime: ( 4) supporting state police organizations and law 
enforcement agencies regarding enquiries and investigation of cases: and 
(5) playing the lead role in combating national and transnational organized 
crime. 198 
The CBI is a Type B ACA because it performs both anti-corruption 
and non-corruption-related functions as reflected in three of its divisions. 
The Anti-Corruption Division is responsible for investigating corruption 
and fraud cases committed by public servants working tor the central 
government. The Economic Crimes Division investigates bank and 
financial frauds, import export and foreign exchange violations, large-
scale smuggling of narcotics, antiques, cultural property, and smuggling 
of other contraband items. The Special Crimes Division deals with cases 
of terrorism, bomb blasts, sensational homicides, kidnapping for ransom 
and organized crime. 199 
The eve was formed in February 1964 on the recommendation of 
the Santhanam Committee to perform these tour functions: (I ) 
investigating improper transactions by public servants: (2) examining 
complaints of corruption, misconduct, lack of integrity or other 
malpractices committed by public servants; (3) supervising the vigilance 
and anti-corruption work of ministries, departments, and public enterprises 
by requesting and checking their reports on these activities; and ( 4) 
requesting the CBI to investigate a case or entrust the complaint, 
information or case for inquiry to the CBI, or to the ministry, department, 
or public enterprise concerned. 200 
India's high level of perceived corruption is also a reflection of the 
ineffectiveness of the CBI and CVC, which are afllicted with several 
weaknesses. The CBI's Achilles' heel is that it is a police agency because 
it derives its investigating powers from the DSPE Act of 1946. This means 
that, unlike Singapore's CPIB or Hong Kong's ICAC, the Government of 
India (GOI) has continued to employ the traditional British colonial 
government's method of relying on the police to curb corruption in India 
since 1963 even though this method is ineffective. As shown in Section 
III, the experiences of the CPIB and ICAC have exposed the folly of 
relying on the police to curb corruption when they are corrupt because the 
"golden rule" is that "the police cannot and should not be responsible for 
198. CBI, Anmwl Report :!014 (New Delhi: CRI, 2015), p. iii. 
199. Ibid., p. 4. 
200. C.V. Narasimhan. "J>rcvention of Corruption: Towards Effective Enforcement." inS. 
Guhan and Samuel Paul ( Eds. ), Cormption in India: Agetula for Action (New Delhi: Vision 
Books, 1997), pp. 264-265. 
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investigating their own deviance and crimes."201 Unlike Singapore and 
Hong Kong, which have rejected the British colonial government's 
method of relying on the police to curb corruption after 15 years and 26 
years, respectively, the Got has not learnt this important lesson after 54 
years because it still relies on the CBI, which is a police agency, to fight 
corruption in the midst of rampant police corruption in India. This 
weakness is not surprising because "the greatest failing of India's domestic 
political system is its inability or unwillingness to curb widespread 
corruption. "202 
The CBI's second weakness is that it is a Type B ACA that is 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases as 
well as other economic crimes and special crimes like terrorism and 
organized crime. After the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 
and the current international concern with combating terrorism, it will be 
difficult for the CBI to focus exclusively on its anti-corruption functions 
because of the competing demands on its limited resources. This means 
that combating corruption is accorded much lower priority than fighting 
terrorism by the CBI. It should be noted that the CBI is not responsible for 
the other important functions of education, prevention and coordination of 
anti-corruption activities, which are neglected in India. 
Third, the CBI is both under-staffed and poorly funded to perform its 
various functions effectively. Table 18 shows that while the CBI's 
establishment has grown from 5,886 in 2003 to 7,274 in 2015, its actual 
strength varies from 4,623 in 2007 to 5,796 in 2013. This means that the 
number of vacancies ranges from 719 ( 12.1 percent) in 2009 to 1,693 (23.3 
percent) in 2015. The CBI's perennial inability to fill its many vacant 
positions during 2002-2015 reflects its serious staff shortage. B.R. Lall, a 
former CBI joint director, described the CBI as "a very small organization 
as compared to the quantum of crimes" committed in India and 
recommended the expansion of its personnel by 20 percent annually for 
the next decade.203 The CBI's staff shortage is also not surprising and 
reflects the Indian state's inadequate capacity to perform its essential 
functions because of"cndcmic shortfalls in human rcsourccs."204 
20 I. Maurice Punch, l'o/ice Corruption. Oel'iance. Accountuhili~r ami RefiJrm in Policing 
(London: Routledge, 2009), p. 245. 
202. Michael R. Auslin, The Em/ of the Asian Cen/1/ry: War, Stug11atio11. and the Risks to 
rile World's mostl~I'IWtllic Regio11 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 118. 
203. B.R. Lall, Who 0\\'IIS the C/11? 11w Naked 1i11tl! (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 
2007), pp. 230-231. 
204. Milan Vaishnav, 1Vhe11 Crime Pays: Money um/ Muscle ill f11cliull Politics (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 43. 
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Table 18: Growth of CBI's Personnel, 2002-2015 
Year Establishment Adual Strength Vacant Positions 
(100%) 
2002 5,920 4,908 (82.9%) 1,012 (17.1%) 
2003 5,886 4.938 (83.9%) 948 ( 16.1%) 
2004 5.891 4.811 (81.7%) 1,080 ( 18.3%) 
2005 5.891 4.711 (80.(1%) 1.180 (20.0%) 
21106 5,959 4.652 (78.1 %) 1.307 (21.9%) 
2007 5.959 4,623 (77.6%) 1,336 (22.4%) 
2008 5.960 4,874 (81.8%) 1,086 ( 18.2%) 
2009 5,961 5.242 (87.9%) 719 (12.1%) 
20 [() 6,526 5.147 (78.9%) 1,379 (21.1%) 
2011 6,590 5,666 (86.0%) 924 (14.0%) 
2012 6,586 5.755 (87.4%) 831 (12.6%) 
2013 6,674 5.796 (86.8%) 878 ( 13.2%) 
2014 6,676 5,676 (85.0%) 1,000 ( 15.0%) 
2015 7.274 5.581 (76.7%) 1.693 (23.3%) 
Sources: CBI. Annual Reports 1004-10/5 (New Delhi: CBI. 2005-2016), various pages 
and CVC, Annual Report10/5 (New Delhi: CVC. 2016). p. N2. 
Table 19: CBI's Budget and Personnel, 2005-2014 
CBI 2005 2008 2014 
Budget (in millions) US$30.3 US$52.1 US$65.5 
Personnel 4,711 4.874 5,676 
Per capita expenditure US$0.03 US$0.04 US$0.05 
Staff-population ratio 1:234,217 I :243,373 1:228.206 
Sources: Compiled by the author from the CBJ's budget and personnel provided in its 
annual reports from2005-2014. 
53 
Arising from the CBI's chronic staff shortage, it is not surprising that 
its staff-population ratio is unfavorable and ranges from I :234,217 in 2005 
to 1 :228.206 in 2014. Table 19 indicates that even though the CBI's budget 
has grown from US$30.3 million in 2005 to US$65.5 million in 2014, its 
per capita expenditure has increased only marginally from US$0.03 to 
US$0.05 during the same period. The CBJ's inadequate personnel and 
budget reflect the GOI's weak political will in curbing corruption in India. 
The CBI's fourth limitation is that it cannot investigate corruption 
cases at the state level because the Constitution of India states that law and 
order come under the jurisdiction of the states. Section 5 of the DSPE Act 
of 1946 gives the CBI investigating powers and indicates that the central 
government can empower it to investigate the notified offenses in any state 
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with the consent of the government of that state. 205 The CBI did not 
encounter any problem with that arrangement when the Congress Party 
was in power in the states and center during the post-independent period. 
However, with the Congress Party's decline in power, some state 
governments had withdrawn the consent given by their predecessors 
"whenever they felt that an investigation taken up by the CBI was 
politically embarrassing or uncomfortable for them." C.V. Narasimhan, a 
former CBI director, contends that the CBI's "unstable" status as an 
investigating agency within a state depends on the latter's mercy and is "a 
serious handicap" in developing a national network of anti-corruption 
investigating units. 211<' 
The CBI's fifth weakness is its lack of independence because it is "a 
nightmare" as an organization that serves "multiple masters" including the 
Ministry of Home Affairs for the appointment of the CBI director; the 
Ministry of Personnel, Training and Public Grievances for its budget; the 
Union Public Service Commission for the appointment of CBI senior 
officers above the rank of Superintendent of Police; the CVC, which 
supervises its investigation of corruption cases; and the Ministry of Law 
and Justice, which pays the salaries of its prosecutors. 207 The CBI was 
perceived by the public as "a pliable tool of the ruling [Congress] party, 
and its investigations tend to become cover-up operations for the misdeeds 
of ministers. "208 Madhav Godbole, a former senior civil servant in India, 
criticized the CBI for being used by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
as "an instrument of persecution" and for its "disgraceful" record of 
investigating corruption cases "involving the high, the mighty and the 
powcrful."209 More recently, the former Central Vigilance Commissioner 
N. Vittal has criticized the CBI's lack of independence and credibility 
because it has become "a football between the party in power and the party 
in opposition" as the cases initiated by one regime arc neutralized by the 
next.210 A former CBI director, D.R. Karthikeyan, admitted that as the CBI 
was a government department, it was "expected to work as per the 
205. Narasimhan, "Prevention of Corruption," p. 255. 
206. Ibid., p. 256. 
207. Krishna K. Tummala, "Can India Combat Corruption?" in Jon S.T. Quah (Ed.). 
Di.fferent Paths to Curbing Cormplion: Lessons from Denmark. Finland. Hong Kong, New 
7..ealaml a/Ill Singapore (Bingley, UK: Emcmld Group Publishing. 2013 ), p. 174. 
208. S.S. Gill, The l'athology of Corntpticm (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 
1998), p. 238. 
209. Madhav Godbole. The Changing Times: A Commemm:1· on Current A,(f{tirs (New 
Delhi: Orient Longman, 2000), p. 88. 
210. N. Villa(, Ending Comtption? /low to Clean Up India (New Delhi: Penguin Books 
India, 2012), pp. 132-134. 
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direction of its employer." 211 The harshest cnttctsm was made by a 
Supreme Court Justice, R.M. Lodha, who denounced the CBI in May 2013 
for being a "caged parrot" and "its master's voice" and scolded the 
attorney-general for interfering in the CBI's investigation of the 
"Coalgate" scandal involving alleged irregularities in the allocation of 
coaltield licenses to private companies.212 
The Supreme Court of India found that the CBI did not follow the 
proper procedure in investigating the Hawala scandal in 1991 because the 
alleged offenders were powerful persons.113 Consequently, on December 
18, 1997, it directed the transfer of the CBI' s supervision from the central 
government to the eve, which became a statutory body responsible for 
supervising the CBI's operations with the enactment of the CVC Act, 2003 
on September II, 2003.214 The CVC supervises the CBI's operations by 
conducting monthly meetings with the CBI director to review the progress 
and quality of the cases investigated. Furthermore, the eve advises the 
disciplinary and other agencies in disciplinary cases involving vigilance at 
the investigation and inquiry stages. It also supervises the vigilance and 
anti-corruption work in the ministries and departments of the central 
government. The Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) in the ministries and 
departments provide advice on vigilance administration and the 
establishment of effective systems and procedures to remove systemic 
failures or loopholes. They submit monthly and annual reports to the eve, 
which holds annual zonal meetings to review and monitor their 
performance. 215 
Table 20: Complaints received and disposed by the eve, 2010-2015 
Year Complaints received Complaints disposed 
2010 16.260 16.211 
2011 16.929 17,238 
2012 37,039 33.308 
2013 31.432 33.284 
211. Ibid .• p. 23. 
212. Ross Colvin and Satampa Bhattachaljya. "i\ 'caged parrot' Supreme Court describes 
CBJ," Reuters, May 10,2013. 
213. The Hawala scandal involved I he payment of USS IN million to several politicians by 
four hawala brokers. including the Jain brothers. A "hawala" is an illegal tmnsaction in foreign 
currency und an economic offense punishable under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 
1973. Sec N.K. Singh, The Politics of Crime and Cormption: A{ormer C/11 officer speaks (New 
Delhi: HarpcrCollins Publishers, 1999), p. 164. 
214. CVC. Amuml Report .?tJtJN (New Oelhi: CBI, 2009), p. I. 
215. Ibid., pp. 2 and 6. 
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2014 62,362 62,099 
2015 29,838 30,789 
Total 193,860 192,929 
Sources: CVC, Amma/ Report2014 (New Delhi: eve, 2015), pp. 23-24 and eve. Annual 
Report2015 (New Delhi: CVC, 2016), p. 22. 
The CVC consists of three Commissioners and 257 personnel (with 
39 vacant positions) and also relies on 208 full-time CVOs and 500 part-
time CVOs in various government departments in 2015.216 The CVC and 
the internal vigilance machinery in the ministries and government 
departments are understaffed to handle its heavy workload, as reflected in 
the complaints and vigilance cases received and disposed by the CVC from 
2010-2015. Table 20 shows that the CVC has received 193,860 complaints 
and disposed of 192,929 complaints during this period. Similarly, Table 
21 confirms that the CVC has received 31 ,698 vigilance cases and 
disposed of 31 ,855 of these cases during 2010-2015. 
Table 21: Vigilance cases received and disposed by the eve, 2010-
2015 
Year Cases received Cases disposed 
2010 5,327 5,522 
2011 5,573 5.341 
2012 5,528 5,720 
2013 5,423 4,801 
2014 5,492 5,867 
2015 4,355 4,604 
Total 31,698 31,855 
Sources: eve. Ammal Report20/4, p. 14 and eve. AIIIIIIUI Repor/2015. p. /4. 
Apart from its severe staff shortage, the other limitation of the CVC 
is that it is an advisory body that relics on other public agencies to 
investigate the complaints of misconduct by civil servants it receives. 
Consequently, given the CVC's limited budget and personnel, it has no 
alternative but .. to continue to rely on vigilance divisions in government 
organizations and public sector units, which remain wcak."217 
216. CVC, tlmmal Rt•port 2015 (New Delhi: CVC. 2016), pp. vii, 98. 
217. Vikram Menon, "Anti-Corruption in India: Issues and Strategies." in Vikram K. Chand 
(Ed.), Reinventing P11blic Sen·ice Deli1·ery• in lm/ia: Selected Clue Swdie.• (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 2006), p. 339. 
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C. Philippines' Competing ACAs 
President Elpidio Quirino established the Integrity Board on May 25, 
1950 to investigate complaints of corruption against civil servants in the 
Philippines. However, it was short-lived and dissolved in November 1950 
because of the lack of public support. 218 During the next 51 years. 18 
A CAs were created by the various presidents, culminating in the formation 
by President Gloria Macapagai-Arroyo of the Presidential Anti-Graft 
Commission (PAGC) and the Governance Advisory Council in April and 
July 200 I, respectively. 21'1 Today, the Philippines has five A CAs: the 
OMB (the lead ACA); the Sandiganbayan (Special Anti-Graft Court): the 
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); the Inter-
Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council (IACC); and the Office of the 
Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs, which assumed the PAGC's functions 
after its dissolution in November 2010 by President Benigno S. Aquino 
III. 220 However, in spite of the efforts of these five ACAs, corruption 
remains a serious problem in the Philippines judging from its performance 
on eight indicators in 2016, as shown in Table 22. While the CPI score of 
the Philippines has increased from 2.77/10 in 1995 to 35/100 in 2016, it is 
still ranked 10 P' among 176 countries in 2016. The Philippines' score on 
the PERC corruption survey has increased from 6.60 to 7.05, indicating 
that the problem of corruption has deteriorated during 1995-2016. 
Table 22: Philippines' Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016 
Indicator Philippines' Performance 
Control of Corruption -0.5 (34. I) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 101"/176 (35/100) 
PERC Corruption Survey IO'h/16 (7.05/10) 
Diversion of Public Funds 10200/138 (2.917) 
Irregular Payments and Bribes I 05'h/138 (3.217) 
Organized Crime H9'h/138 (4.317) 
Ethical Behavior of Fim1s 71 "/I 38 (3.817) 
Public Trust in Politicians 99' 11/138 (2.417) 
So11rces: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Transparency 
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; Asian lntelliRt'nce, No. 944, March 
30, 2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.). 7111.' Global Competilil'f!fless Report 2016-2017, p. 297. 
211!. Quah. "Bureaucratic Com1ption in the ASEAN Countries," 159. 
219. Quah. C11rhing Corr11ption in Asian Cowuries. p. 136. 
220. Eric Vincent C. Batalla, "Trending the Straight and Righteous Path: Curbing Corruption 
in the Philippines," Asian f.'ducation and /Jevelopmem St11dit•s. 4 (I) (20 15): 55-56. 
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Corruption is widespread in the Philippines because the many ACAs 
have been ineffective during the past 67 years. There are two indicators of 
the weak political will of the many governments in the Philippines in 
combating corruption since 1950: (I) the inadequate human and financial 
resources allocated by the government to the OMB, as reflected in its high 
staff-population ratio and low per capita expenditure 221 and (2) the 
continued reliance by Filipino political leaders on ineffective multiple 
ACAs without making any improvements to enhance their effectiveness. 
Table 23: OMB's Budget and Personnel, 2005-2014 
OMB 2005 2008 2011 2013 2014 
Budget (in millions) US$12.0 US$19.6 US$25.2 US$37.5 US$38.8 
Personnel 957 1,007 1,193 1,211 1,214 
Per capita US$0.15 US$0.22 US$0.26 US$0.38 US$0.39 
expenditure 
Staff-population 1:85,057 1:89,076 1:79,883 1:80,512 1:81,631 
ratio 
Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the OMB's budget and personnel 
provided in its annual reports from 2005-2014. 
Table 23 shows that even though the OMB's personnel and budget 
have increased during 2005-2014, it is still severely under-staffed and 
under-funded because its staff-population ratio has fluctuated from 
I :79,883 in 20 II to I :89,076 in 2008 and its per capita expenditure has 
increased from US$0.15 to US$0.39 during 2005-2014. Former 
Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo concluded that the OMB was "designed to 
fail because of its crippling lack of resources" as he found that in 2004, the 
OMB 's field investigator-bureaucracy ratio of I: 17,045 compared 
unfavorably with the ICAC's ratio of I :208, and the ICAC's per capita 
expenditure of US$12.43 exceeded the OMB's per capita expenditure of 
US$0.10 by 116 times.222 ln 2014, there were 980 vacancies as the OMB 
had I ,214 personnel or 55.3 percent of its established strength of 2,194 
positions.223 
Apart from its limited budget and personnel, the OMB also lacks 
credibility as impeachment complaints were filed in 1996, 2001 and 2002 
221. Jon S.T. Quah, "Benchmarking for Excellence: A Comparative Analysis of Seven 
Asian Anti-Corruption Agencies," 1bia Pac!fic Joumal of Public Administration, Jl (2) 
(December 2009): 182. 
222. Simeon V. Marcelo, Combating Corntplion in the Philippines: Are we Plwulering our 
Chances or Doing it lleuer? (Quezon City: National College of Public Administration and 
Govcnmnec, University of the l'hilippines, Working Paper Series No.2, 2005), pp. I and 3. 
223. OMB, Amwal Report:!0/4 (Quezon City: OMB. 2015), p. 35. 
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against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto during his seven-year term for 
betraying the public trust. Even though these complaints were dismissed 
by congressmen, they have "sullied the already unsavoury reputation of 
the Ombudsman. "m Hence, it is not surprising that the respondents in the 
2009 Social Weather Stations Surveys of Enterprises on Corruption 
viewed the OMB negatively with a net sincerity rating of -8 percent.225 
Ombudsman Merceditas Guiterrez was criticized for focusing the OMB's 
limited resources on investigating petty corruption instead of continuing 
her predecessor's exposure of grand corruption cases. Consequently, the 
OMB was described as "the Street Ombudsman" because of its emphasis 
on investigating petty corruption cases.226 As Guiterrez was a classmate of 
the First Gentleman, Miguel Arroyo, she was criticized for protecting the 
interests of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, her husband, their friends 
and political allies. She was impeached by Congress on March 22, 20 II 
for not investigating the allegations against former President Macapagai-
Arroyo and resigned as Ombudsman on May 5, 2011. 227 The OMB's net 
sincerity rating under the administration of President Benigno Aquino has 
declined from +39 percent in 2012 to +30 percent in 2016.228 
The other two major ACAs-the Presidential Commission on Good 
Government (PCGG) and Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council 
(IACC)-are ineffective in curbing corruption tor different reasons. The 
PCGG was formed by President Corazon Aquino in February 1986 to 
identify and retrieve the money stolen by the Marcos family and its 
cronies. It is not strictly speaking, an ACA because it is not involved in 
investigating corruption cases or in corruption prevention and education. 
Nevertheless, it has been a target for charges of corruption, favoritism and 
incompetence. By June 1988, five of its agents were charged with 
corruption and 13 agents were under investigation_22') Quintin Doromal, 
224. Sheila S. Coronel and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, b!l"estigating Cormption: A Do-lt-rour.w:lf 
Guide (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2002), pp. 261-262. 
225. Linda Luz B. Guerrero, Mahar Mangahas and Leo Rando S. Laroza, 7111! 2009 SII'S 
Sm·•·eys of EmeqJrises on Corntption (Quezon City: Social Weather Stations, 20 10), p. 7. 
226. "The Street Ombudsman." News break Online. November 21, 2006. 
227. M. Cayabyab, "PH Ombudsman behind other anti-com1ption agencies in Asia.'' 1'/:"RA 
Files. May 10,2011. 
228. Social Weather Stations. "The IJ'h SWS Survey of Enterprises on Corruption: Marked 
Improvement in the Fight against Corruption in the last six years, but 2016 Survey shows some 
backsliding," Manila, October 5, 2016, available at: 
https:/ /www .sws.org.phlswsmain/artcldisppage/'!artcsyscode= ART -20161 005151549 
(accessed June 19, 2017). 
229. Jon S.T. Quah, "Comparing Anti-Corruption Measures in Asian Countries," Asian 
Review of Public Administration. II (2) ( 1999): 81. 
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who was the PCGG Commissioner from April 1986 to October 1987, was 
charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic 
Act No. 30 19) on January 25, 1988. His successors, Ramon Diaz and Mary 
Concepcion Bautista, were also charged in 1989 for the same offense. 230 
In January 2013, the PCGG chair, Andreas Bautista, admitted that the 
accusations against the PCGG officials were "not without basis" because 
"they were the ones in charge of the chicken coop and some of them helped 
themselves to the eggs.'' 231 By 2016, after 30 years, the PCGG had 
recovered only a total ofUS$3.4 billion from Swiss bank deposits, shares, 
real estate, paintings and jewelry. 232 As the PCGG has failed to meet its 
objective of recovering fully the US$1 0 billion stolen by Marcos and his 
family after 31 years, it has certainly outlived its usefulness and should be 
abolished without further delay. 233 
The IACC is a voluntary alliance of the OMB, Civil Service 
Commission (CSC), Commission of Audit (COA), PAGC and National 
Bureau of Investigation formed by their heads on June II, 1997. The 
Department of Justice became the sixth member in 1998 and President 
Estrada officially recognised the IACC as part of his anti-corruption policy 
in August 1999.234 The IACC's three functions arc: (l) coordinating the 
activities of its members by sharing information, initiating the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of graft cases, and forming ad hoc 
inter-agency task forces to investigate major cases involving substantial 
losses of government resources; (2) conducting inter-agency skills training 
programs for the personnel of its members to enhance their skills in fraud 
detection, investigation, and prosecution of the offenders; and (3) 
promoting inter-agency conferences to enable the personnel of its 
members to exchange ideas and discuss common issues and problems. 235 
The IACC's role is to enhance coordination among its member 
agencies but, "in reality, it is not active."236 The IACC has only met twice, 
and the "slow progress in its revitalization" reflects the inability of its six 
230. Asian Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS), Grappling with Graft and Cormption 
(Quezon City: AISS, 2003), pp. 143,465. 
231. "PCGG: Hunt for Marcos loot to end," lnq11irer.twt. January 2, 2013. 
232. "The Marcos family fortune," Straits rimes, August 31, 2017, p. A 16. 
233. Quah, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five Asian 
Countries," I 54. 
234. OMB, Annual Repor/1010 (Quezon City: OMB. 2011 ), pp. 26-27. 
235. Sofronio B. Ursa), Ami-Graft Guidebook (Quezon City: Good Governance Books, 
2006 ). pp. 222-223. 
236. Eiji Oyamada, "President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's Anti-Corruption Strategy in the 
Philippines," Asian .lo11nwl of l'olitical Science, 13 (I) (June 2005): 99. 
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member agencies to collaborate eflectively among themselves. m 
Alexander Rodriguez of the COA said that it was "almost impossible" to 
get the heads of the six member agencies to meet because of their hectic 
schedules. 238 The former Ombudsman, Merceditas Gutierrez, 
"deactivated" the IACC by not convening it. Furthermore, instead of 
cooperating with the CSC, the OMB competed with it by also 
implementing the Oplan Red Plate program, which the OMB, COA, and 
CSC had earlier agreed under the Solana Covenant to be the CSC's 
responsibility.239 The IACC's inability to coordinate the activities of the 
ACAs is reflected in the UNODC's Country Review Report of the 
Philippines, which has identified "inter-agency coordination and limited 
resources" as the major challenges faced by the OMB in investigating 
bribery and embezzlement cases.240 Like the PCGG, the IACC has clearly 
outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded without further delay. 
The second manifestation of the Filipino political leaders' weak 
political will in curbing corruption is their continued reliance on 
ineffective multiple ACAs in spite of their flaws. Like Afghanistan, China. 
India, Pakistan, Taiwan and Vietnam, the Philippines also adopted the 
strategy of relying on multiple A CAs instead of a single ACA. Quimson 
contends that the proliferation of ACAs in the Philippines has led to 
"duplication, layering and turf wars.'' 241 Instead of coordinating their 
activities and cooperating with each other, these ACAs compete tor 
recognition, personnel and resources because they are understaffed and 
poorly funded. Their overlapping jurisdictions diffuse anti-corruption 
237. Ronald D. Holmes, "Combating Comtption in the Philippines: The Ditliculty and 
Danger of Organizational Reform/lluman Resource Development Initiatives." in Ma 
Concepcion P. AI filer and Eleanor E. Nicolas (Eds.), l'ub/ic Administration plus Gm•erna11ce: 
Assessing the Past, Addressing the Future (Quezon City: National College of Public 
Administration, University of the Philippines. 2007), p. 181. 
238. Coronel and Kalaw-Tirol./m·esli~cllin~ Cor111ption. p. 274. 
239. Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN). 7'he Office of the Omlmd.wum: Is 
there Institutional Weukness? PHDR Issue 200!1/2009, No. 2, p. 5. 
240. UNODC, Country Review Report of the Philippines. Review by Bangladesh and Egypt 
of the Implementation by the Philippines of Articles 15-42 of Chapter Ill. "Criminali7.ation and 
Law Enforcement" and Articles 44-50 of Chapter IV, "International Cooperation." of the 
UNCAC for the 2011-2012 review cycle, pp. 8, 35, Vienna, 2012, available at: 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/docs/uncac/Philippines%20Country"lo20Report.pdf (accessed 
August 8, 2017). 
241. Gabriella Quimson, National lflfegrity Sysl<'llls Transparency ftuematimw/ Cormtl)' 
Sllldy Report: Philippines 2006 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2006), p. 30. 
62 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
efforts, and result in "poor coordination in policy and program 
implementation, weak management and wastage of resources. "242 
Why are new ACAs created by a new administration in the 
Philippines without evaluating the effectiveness of the existing ACAs? As 
the establishment of such A CAs is redundant, expensive and inefficient, 
Co et a/. have advised that a new elected government should enhance 
existing anti-corruption measures instead of initiating new reforms. 243 
Unfortunately, President Rodrigo Duterte has ignored their wise advice 
and announced in his speech to 70 new presidential appointees on August 
29, 2017 that he would establish a new PAGC to investigate corruption 
complaints in government. Apart from not justifying the creation of the 
PAGC, President Duterte also demanded unrealistically that the 
investigation of corruption complaints should not exceed more than a 
month.244 The continued reliance on the ineffective multiple ACAs during 
the past 67 years is an unequivocal manifestation of the Filipino political 
leaders' lack of political will in combating corruption. 
V. NINE LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS IN ASIAN 
COUNTRIES 
Although the dijjiculties l?{ applying lessons are numerous, the 
costs c?f ignorance are substantial too. 
Richard Rose245 
Table 24 provides a convenient summary of the analysis of the 
different levels of effectiveness of the ACAs in six Asian countries. 
Singapore, Hong Kong SAR and South Korea employ the third pattern of 
corruption control as they rely on the CPIB, ICAC and ACRC, 
respectively, to enforce the anti-corruption laws. By contrast, China, India 
and Philippines employ the second pattern of corruption control of relying 
on multiple ACAs, ranging from two ACAs in India, four ACAs in China 
and five ACAs in Philippines (see Table 15). From Table 24, it can be seen 
that Type A ACAs like Singapore's CPIB and Hong Kong's ICAC are 
242. Oyamada, "President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's Anti-Corruption Strategy in the 
Philippines," 99. 
243. Edna E.A. Co, M. Lim, M.E.J. lao and l.J. Juan, Minimizing Lim·uption: Philippine 
Democmc:v Assessmem (Pasig City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Philippines Office, 2007), p. 21. 
244. Pia Ranada, "Dutcrtc to create anti-graft commission," Rapph•r, 29 August 2017, 
available at: https://www.rappler.com/rmtion/180499-duterte-ereatc-anti-graft-commission 
(accessed September I, 20 17) 
245. Richard Rose, l.eamingfrom Comparati1·e Public Polic:r: A Practical Guide (london: 
Routledge, 2005), p. xii. 
COMBATING ASIAN CORRUPTION 63 
more effective than the Type B ACAs in South Korea, China, India and 
Philippines, judging from their 2016 CPI rankings and scores and other 
indicators. Apart from the strong political will of the governments of 
Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, which is reflected in their higher per 
capita expenditures and favourable staff-population ratios in 20 14, both 
city states have higher GOP per capita and levels of government 
effectiveness in 2015 than the other four countries. 
Table 24: Comparison of Six ACAs, 2014-2016 
ACA CPI GDPper Per capita Staff-
rank capita expenditure population 
& 2015 2014 ratio 2014 
score 
2016 
CPIB 7'h US$52,888 US$5.36 I :26,682 
(Type A) (84) 
Singapore 
ICAC 15'h US$42,327 US$16.59 1:5.333 
(Type A) (77) 
Hong Kong 
SAR 
ACRC 52nJ US$27,221 US$1.15 1:108,430 
(Type B) (53) 
South 
Korea 
CCDI 79'h US$8,027 No datah No datah 
(Type B) (40) 
China 
CBI 79'h US$1,598 US$0.05 I :228,206 
(Type B) (40) 
India 
OMB I 0 I" US$2,904 US$0.39 1:81.631 
(Type B) (35) 
Philippines 
•Data provided are the percentile ranks of the six countries 










So11rces: Tmnsparency lntcmational, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; World Bank, 
"GDP per capita (current US$)"; World Bank. "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2015" 
and Tables 9, II, 13, 19 ami 23. 
There are nine lessons that policymakers can learn from the analysis 
of the different levels of effectiveness of the ACAs in the six Asian 
countries in the previous sections. 
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A. Political Will is Essential for Effective Corruption Control 
After reviewing several definitions, Post, Raile and Raile define the 
"complex, multifaceted concept" of political will as "the extent of 
committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy 
solution to a particular problcm."246 Brinkcrhoffs specific definition of 
political will is "the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve 
a set of objectives - in this case, anti-corruption policies and programs -
and to sustain the costs of those actions over time.''247 In other words, 
political will refers to the sustained commitment of political leaders to 
implement anti-corruption policies and programs. In the same vein, 
Kpundeh contends that political will is "a critical starting point for 
sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programs" because 
elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs and other 
stakeholders must demonstrate "credible intent" to "attack perceived 
causes or effects" of systemic corruption. Indeed, without political will, 
promises by political leaders and governments to reform the civil service 
or combat corruption will "remain mere rhetoric.''248 
Political will is critical for effective corruption control as politicians 
can change "a culture of corruption if they wish to do so" because "they 
make the laws and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced." 
Consequently, it is not surprising that those corrupt politicians "who arc 
the greatest beneficiaries of corruption have the greatest power and use the 
corrupt nature of government to maintain that power."249 As combating 
corruption is expensive, the ACAs need sufficient budget and personnel to 
enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. A World Bank study of the 
effectiveness of 50 A CAs concludes that "political will and commitment 
are the cornerstone of every successful anti-corruption effort. "250 
246. Lori Ann Post, Amber N.W. Raile and Eric D. Raile. "Defining Political Will," l'o/itic.~ 
am/ Policy. 38 (4) (2010): 659. 
247. Derick W. Brinkerhoff. "Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An 
Analytic Framework," Public Administmtion am/ /Jen:lopment, 20 (3) (2000): 242. 
248. Sahr J. Kpundch, "Political Will in Fighting Corruption," in Kpundeh and llors (Eds.), 
Corn1ption Integrity lmprm•ementlnitiati•·es in Dew/oping Countries, p. 92. 
249. Jan Senior, Corruption the ll'orlcl's Big C: Cases, Causes, Consequences, Cures 
(london: Institute of Economic Affitirs, 2006), pp. I K4, IK7. 
250. Franccsca Rccanatini, "Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb 
Corruption'!" in Susan Rosc-Ackcnnan and Tina Soreide ( Eds.), llllemationall/andhook oil tht• 
Economics of Corruption, Vol. 2 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011 ), p. 565. 
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Table 25: Per Capita Expenditures and Staff-Population 
Ratios of Nine ACAs, 2014 
ACA Budget Personnel Per capita Staff-
65 
(in millions) expenditure population 
ratio 
ICAC (Type A) US$120. 14 1,358 US$16.59 1:5.333 
CPIB (Type A) US$29.30 205 US$5.36 1:26,682 
ACRC (Type B) US$58.30 465 US$1.15 I: 108.430 
AAC (Type A) US$14.40 240 US$0.61 1:97.641 
OMB (Type B) US$38.80 1.214 US$0.39 1:81.631 
ACC (Type A) US$5.99 1,264 US$0.37 1:127.369 
KPK (Type A) US$50.1 7 1,102 US$0.19 1:230,943 
NAB (Type A) US$20.52 4023 US$0.11 I :461.442 
CBI (Type B) US$65.50 5,676 US$0.05 I :228,206 
• As the NAB's personnel in 2014 is not available, its total manpower strength of 402 in 
1999 is used as more than 300 seconded arn1y officers returned to the Pakistani army in 
February 2001!. Sec Transparency International Pakistan, Pakistan National lnte~rity 
.~)·stem Country Report 1014 (Karachi: TIP. 2014), p. 163. 
Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the budgets and personnel provided 
in the annual reports of the A CAs. 
While all govemments have budget constraints, their "allocation of 
limited resources for ACA activities" signals their lack of "genuine 
commitment to the ACA 's mission. " 251 Table 25 confirms that the strong 
political will of the govemments of Hong Kong SAR and Singapore in 
curbing corruption is manifested in the higher per capita expenditures and 
more favorable staff-population ratios of the ICAC and CPIB, 
respectively. By contrast, the weak political will of the governments in 
South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and 
India is reflected in the lower per capita expenditures and unfavorable 
statT-population ratios of the ACRC, Agency Against Corruption (AAC), 
OMB, Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi (KPK), National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and CBI. 
respectively. 
In addition to providing suflicient budget and personnel to the AC A, 
it will be shown below that the government has to further demonstrate its 
political will by ensuring that the ACA functions as an independent 
watchdog that enforces the anti-corruption laws impartially instead of an 
ineffective paper tiger or, even worse, as an attack dog against its political 
opponents. 
251. Ibid., p. 549. 
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B. The Importance of Policy Context 
In view of the contextual differences of the 26 Asian countries shown 
in Table 3, and the fact that the causes of corruption are country specific, 
Shah cautions that adopting "one-size-fits-all approaches" to countries, 
which vary widely in the incidence of corruption and quality of 
governance, will fail because "policymakers need to understand the local 
circumstances that encourage or permit public and private actors to be 
corrupt."252 As the incidence of corruption is inversely related to the 
quality of governance in a country, those "countries with high corruption 
have a low quality of governance, those with medium corruption have fair 
governance, and those with low corruption have good governance." 253 
There is a strong correlation between corruption and weak institutions 
because "bad institutions allow corruption to take hold, and corruption 
tends to weaken institutions over time leaving greed unchecked."254 Table 
26 shows that Singapore, Hong Kong SAR and Japan have a low incidence 
of corruption and good governance. Conversely, those 20 countries with 
high incidence of corruption from North Korea to Malaysia have poor 
governance. The four countries with medium incidence of corruption 
(Bhutan, Taiwan, Brunei and South Korea) have fair governance. 
Table 26: Corruption Incidence and Quality of 
Governance in 27 Asian Countries, 2016 
Corruption CPI rank and Country Governance Quality of 
incidence score 2016 (total governance 
(N=176) percentile 
rankl 2016 
Low 7th(84) Singapore 529.7 Good 
(N=3) 15th(77) Hong Kong SAR 511.7 (500-600) 
20th (72) Japan 529.5 
27th (65) Bhutan 376.3 
Medium 31 51 (61) Taiwan 499.6 Medium 
(N=4) 4J 51 (58) Brunei Darus. 415.2 (370-499) 
52nd(53) South Korea 436.7 
55th (49) Malaysia 367.2 
79th (40) India 270.9 
79th (40) China 241.2 
87th(38) Mongolia 318.5 
90th (37) Indonesia 268.6 
252. Shah, "Tailoring the Fight against Cormption to Country Circumstances," p. 236. 
253. Ibid., p. 243. 
254. Jake Bright and Aubrey Hruby, 71u· Ne.tt Aji-ica: A11 t:mergi11g Co11ti11ent Becomes a 
Global Powerhouse (New York: St Martin's Press, 20 15 ), p. 125. 
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95th (36) Sri Lanka 290.9 
95th (36) Maldives 226.0 
101,. (35) Thailand 259.0 
High I 0 I,. (35l Philippines 237.0 Low 
(N=20) 101'' (35) Timor-Leste 170.0 (0-3691 
JIJ'" (33) Vietnam 248.3 
116'11 (32l Pakistan 125.6 
123'~ (30) Lao PDR 170.1 
131" (29) Nepal 144.5 
136'11 (28) Papua N. Guinea 175.5 
136t11 (28) Myanmar 130.1 
I 45th (26l Bangladesh 141.1 
I 56th (21) Cambodia 149.4 
169'11 (15) Afghanistan 46.2 
174'" ( 12) North Korea 34.4 
Sources: Compiled from Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016" 
and World Bank. "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016." 
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Shah contends that ACAs arc more likely to be effective in those 
countries with low incidence of corruption and good governance, such as 
Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, than in those countries with high 
incidence of corruption and poor governance like China, India and 
Philippines. 255 However, the success of Indonesia's KPK in combating 
corruption shows that an ACA can be "highly effective even in an 
environment of poor governance and high corruption, and in a relatively 
short period."256 Nevertheless, policymakers in those Asian countries with 
rampant corruption and poor governance must heed Shah's advice to avoid 
misusing ACAs as "tools of political victimization" m as will be 
elaborated below as the sixth lesson. Furthermore, policymakers in those 
countries that are contemplating the establishment of an ACA, like Papua 
New Guinea, should be aware of the preconditions tor its success and the 
need to improve public sector governance by strengthening the rule of law 
and institutions of accountability.258 
In sum, policymakers in those Asian countries that wish to enhance 
the effectiveness of their ACAs must identify those unfavorable aspects of 
their policy contexts which hinder their performance. For example, its 
small land area of 298 sq. km is deceptive and not advantageous for 
combating corruption because the Maldives consists of I, 190 small islands 
255. Shah. "Tailoring the Fight against Cormption to Country Circumstances.'' pp. 243-244. 
256. Emil P. Bolongaita. An £tception to til!' Ruh•? ll'hy Indonesia's Ami-Corruption 
Commission succeed~ ll'herc others don't. U4 Issue. August. No. 4 (Bergen: C'hr. M ichclsen 
Institute. 2010). p. 28. 
257. Shah. "T;~iloring the Fight against Com1ption to Country Circumstances.'' p. 244. 
258. Ibid., p. 244. 
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grouped into 26 atolls, which are spread over 90,000 km. According to 
Gayoom, an Investigation Officer with the Maldives' ACC, the 
geographical barriers between the islands make it difficult for the ACC 
officers to reach destinations easily when prompt action is required to 
investigate cases urgently. Sea or air travel is also costly and not always 
available because of poor weather conditions. Consequently, it is time 
consuming for the ACC officers to obtain a court order for freezing and 
seizing suspicious bank accounts, confiscating undue properties and funds, 
and searching and seizing documentary evidence. 259 
C. Address Causes of Corruption and Not its Symptoms 
The third Jesson is that policymakers must initiate appropriate 
reforms to tackle corruption by addressing its causes instead of its 
symptoms. In spite of what is known about the causes of corruption, 260 
governments in many Asian countries have failed to do so because it is 
easier to deal with the symptoms than to address the root causes of 
corruption.261 More importantly, corruption is widespread in many Asian 
countries because their political leaders have made decisions which 
facilitate rather than curb corruption. Furthermore, corrupt politicians, 
civil servants, business persons and citizens in these countries resist and 
subvert the implementation of comprehensive anti-corruption reforms to 
protect their vested interests. 
In his comparative study of anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong, 
India and Indonesia, Palmier identified three important causes of 
corruption: low salaries of civil servants: ample opportunities for 
corruption provided by regulations and red tape; and the low probability 
of detecting and punishing corrupt offenders. 262 More specifically, he 
hypothesized that: "At one extreme, with few opportunities, good salaries, 
and effective policing, corruption will be minimal; at the other, with many 
opportunities, poor salaries, and weak policing, it will be considerable."263 
Thus, it would be difficult for many Asian countries to minimize 
corruption if their governments fail to improve the low salaries of their 
259. Fathimath Haifa Abdul Gayoom, ''Criminal Justice Response to Com1ption in 
Maldi\'es," Resource .\/meria/.1· Series. No. 98 (20161: L\9. 
260. Sec for example, Daniel Treisman. "What have We Learned about the Causes of 
Corruption from Ten Years ofCross-National Empirical Research'?" Annual Rel'iewofPolitica/ 
Science. /0 (20071: 211-244. 
261. Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner. 711ink like a Freak: Jlm1· to 111i11k Smarter 
abowAI11uW 1:'1'1'1)'/hing (London: Allen Lane, 20141. pp. 66-67. 
262. Palmier. 71Je Comml o(llureaucratic Cormption, p. 271. 
263. Ibid .. p. 272. 
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civil servants, reduce red tape, and increase the probability of detecting 
and punishing corrupt offenders. 
Table 27: Red Tape and Corruption in Ten Asian Countries in 2016 
Country Jo:use of doing llealing with construction CPI2016 
business rank permits Rank and 
2016 (N=I89) No. of No. of days Score 
procedures (N=I76) 
Sinl!aoorc .~ 10 26 7th (84) 
South Korea 4'h 10 28 52nd (53) 
llonl! Korw SAR , .. II 72 1s•• (77) 
Taiwan ll'h 10 93 JIV ({J)) 
Malaysia 1 x•• 15 79 55th (41)) 
Papua New 1451h 17 217 IJ(Jth (2!\) 
Guinea 
Mvanmar I 67'• 14 95 136'h (2!\) 
Timor·l.cste 17J'd 16 207 101~ (35) 
Banl!ladcsh 174'h 13.4 269 145th(26) 
Afl!hanistan 177'h II 353 J69L' (15) 
Sources: World Bank, Doit1~ BIL5itJess :!0/6: Mt•as11rit1g Re,.,'lllatory Qua/i~l' at1d Ej]icietl(\' 
(Washin1,.>ton, DC: World Bank, 2016), pp. 110, 187,207,212, 217,222,226, 232, 23X· 
239: and Transparency International, "Comtption Perceptions Index 2016." 
The association between red tape, which is reflected in the ease of 
doing business rank, and corruption in ten Asian countries in 20 16 is 
shown in Table 27, which confinns that the top tive Asian countries in 
terms of the ease of doing business rank have higher CPI scores than their 
bottom five counterparts. Singapore, which is ranked first for the ease of 
doing business, has a CPI score of 84 compared to Afghanistan's 177'h 
rank for the ease of doing business and its CPI score of 15 in 20 16. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that while it takes 26 days to get a 
construction pennit in Singapore, the same process of getting a 
construction pennit requires 353 days in Afghanistan, or nearly 14 times 
longer. In other words, it would be difficult to minimize corruption in 
Asian countries without reducing red tape. 
D. Rely on Country's Best Minds to Combat Corruption 
Corrupt individuals and organizations in Asian countries are 
powerful and have vested interests to circumvent the anti-corruption laws 
to avoid arrest and conviction for their offenses. Corruption is a fonnidable 
foe to defeat in these countries because corrupt individuals are highly 
intelligent and capable of finding legal loopholes or other methods to 
circumvent the anti-corruption laws. The most prominent example of a 
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"career fraudster" 2M is Bernard Madoff, who was "smart, savvy, and 
experienced at bucking the systcm" 265 because his Ponzi scheme had 
resulted in defrauding his clients of more than US$10 billion.266 
The personnel of public organizations arc not only their "most 
precious asset" but also "the critical factor" responsible for their 
effectiveness. 267 Furthermore, the increased reliance on technology to 
improve the delivery of public services in Asian countries today means 
that their civil services must be able to maintain expertise by attracting. 
nurturing and retaining high-quality personneJ.268 As specialized public 
organizations, effective ACAs need "well-trained personnel, including 
sufficient numbers with highly specialized skills" who arc recruited on the 
basis of merit, adequately compensated and accountable for their 
actions. 269 
Schein has attributed Singapore's success to its incorruptible and 
competent civil service as "having 'the best and brightest' in government 
is probably one of Singapore's major strengths in that they arc potentially 
the most able to invent what the country needs to survive and grow.''270 
An important lesson from Singapore's experience in curbing corruption is 
the CPIB's reliance on expertise. As shown in Section lll.A, the CPIB has 
enhanced its enforcement capacity by focusing on capability building of 
its officers and building networks and partnerships with other public 
agencies in Singapore. The CPIB's commitment to organizational 
excellence is reflected in the many awards it has won, beginning with the 
Singapore Quality Class Award in 1998, followed by the People 
264. A career fraudstcr is a malefactor whose primary motive is to commit fraud and other 
crimes. Sec Mark Button ami Jim Gee, Coumering l·imul.for Compt'liti1·e Adval/lage: J11e 
Pr(J/i.'ssimwl Approach to Reducing the l.ast Great 1/idden Cost (Chichester, UK: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2013). p. 34. 
265. Peter J. Sander, Madofl Corruption. Deceit and the Making of the World'.~ Mosl 
iVotorious l'md Scheme (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2009), p. 223. 
266. Colleen P. Eren, /Jel'llie Mmlt!fland the Cri.~is: The Puh/ic 1i-ial of Capitalism 
(Stanford. CA: Stanford University Press, 2017). p. 6. 
267. 0. Glenn Stahl, P11hlic Personnd Administration. X'h edition (New York: Harper & 
Row Publishers, 1983), pp. 3. 6. 
268. Ibid., p. 13. 
269. l'utri.:k Mcughcr uml Caryn Vnland, "Anti-Corruption Ag~nci<'' (A(' As): Office of 
Democracy and Governance Anti-Corruption Program Brief' (Washington, DC: United Stutes 
Agency for International Development, 2006), p. 12. 
270. Edgar H. Schein, Strategic Pragmatism: The Culfllre of Singapore's Economic 
De1·e/opment Hocml (C'amhritlgc. MA: MIT J>ress, 1996), pp. 221-222. 
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Excellence Award in 2003, and the Distinguished Public Service Award 
for Organizational Excellence in 2005.171 
Hong Kong's ICAC has also succeeded in recruiting qualified 
personnel with its "special qualifications, screening procedures, and 
remuneration packages" as it has filled I ,369 positions (94 percent) of its 
sanctioned strength of I ,457 personnel in 20 16.272 However, as shown in 
Table 28, some ACAs like Sri Lanka's Commission to Investigate 
Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), Bhutan's ACC. 
Philippines' OMB, Bangladesh's ACC and India's CBI have encountered 
tremendous difficulties in recruiting personnel to stafT their positions. As 
Sri Lanka's CIABOC has 56 percent vacancies, its existing staff of 353 
personnel in 2015 is clearly inadequate and cannot cope with the 
increasing number of complaints and the backlog of 13,665 complaints 
during the same year. It is therefore not surprising that the CIABOC has 
identified its "foremost challenge" as the "lack of staff to handle the rising 
number of complaints.'' m It would be difficult for the CIABOC to 
improve its performance without recruiting more qualified personnel to till 
its vacant positions. 
Table 28: Vacant Positions in Five Asian ACAs, 2014-2015 
ACA Year Establishment Actual Vacant 
(100%) Streneth Positions 
India's CBI 21114 6,676 5,676 (85%) 1.000 ( 15%) 
Bangladesh's ACC 21114 1.264 960(76%) 304 <24~<>> 
Philippines' OMB 21114 2.194 1.214 (55%) 980 (45'Vo) 
Bhutan's ACC 21115 128 70 (55%) 58 (45%) 
Sri Lanka's CIABOC 2015 802 353 (44%) 449(56%) 
So11rces: CBI, Ann11al Repor/ 2014 (New Delhi: CBI. 2015). p. X4; Tmnsparcncy 
International Bangladesh. Ami-( 'ormplion Agencies Strengthening lnitialil't' Assessment 
of Bangladesh :lnti-Cormplion Commission !0/6 (Dhaka: TIB, 2016), pp. 22-23; OMB, 
Amwal Reporl 2014 (Quezon City: OMB, 2015), p. 35; Bhutan ACC. :lmwal Report 20/.f 
(Thimphu: ACC, 2015), p. 411; and CIABOC. Amuwl Report !015 (Colombo: CIABOC. 
2016), p. 33. 
Similarly, Bhutan's ACC has also been unable to fill45 percent of its 
sanctioned strength or to retain its staff as reflected in its high attrition rate 
271. Jon S.T. Quah, "Curbing Corruption in Singapore: The Importance of Political Will. 
Expcnise. Enforcement. and Context," in Quah (Ed.),l>if}crent Paths to Curbing Comtption, p. 
156. 
272. Meagher and Voland. "Anti-Corruption Agencies." p. 12 and ICAC. :lmwal Report 
!0/6(Hong Kong: ICAC. 2017). p. 23. 
273. CIABOC, Annual Rqwr/2015 (Colombo: CIAROC, 2016), pp. 33-34. 
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of 16.2 percent in 2010 and 2014. The reasons for the ACC's low 
recruitment and high attrition rates are: high workload and performance 
pressure, demand for high behavioral standards, perceived inequalities, a 
weak corporate culture, and better career opportunities elsewhere. The 
ACC's serious staff shortage has aggravated the workload of the existing 
personnel, especially the managers, and has affected its effectiveness in 
combating corruption. 274 
Table 28 shows that in 2014, the OMB's 1,214 personnel constitute 
only 55 percent of its established strength of 2,194 positions. This means 
that the OMB is severely under-staffed with 980 vacant positions (45 
percent) in 2014. As Bangladesh ACC's 960 personnel constitute only 76 
per cent of its approved staff strength of 1,264 in 2014, it needs to recruit 
more personnel to fill its 304 vacant positions. India's CBI has only 15 
percent vacancies in 2014 but it has been plagued by the problem of under-
staffing since its formation in 1963 because of its unpopular policy of 
"deputation" of suitable personnel from the states or the Inspector General 
of Police for transfer to the CBI. 275 
In short, it is unrealistic lor a government to expect its ACA to be 
efTective in curbing corruption if the ACA has not been provided with 
adequate personnel to perform its anti-corruption functions. Bhutan's 
ACC is trying its best to overcome its staff shortage among its small 
population of797,760. India, Bangladesh, Philippines and Sri Lanka have 
much larger populations but the CBI, ACC, OMB and CIABOC would be 
unable to improve their performance unless their perennial statT shortage 
is rectified. 
E. Rely on an Independent, Well-Staffed and Funded Type A 
ACA 
The success of Denmark, New Zealand and Finland in combating 
corruption, which is reflected in their top three rankings on the CPI in 
2016, shows that it is possible to curb corruption effectively without 
relying on an ACA if there arc other institutions to ensure good 
governance. 271' However, this option is unsuitable for those Asian 
countries that do not have other strong institutions to tackle the rampant 
corruption. Faced with the other two alternatives of relying on either a 
single ACA or multiple ACAs, policymakers should avoid relying on the 
ineffective ACAs in China, India and Philippines, and establish a Type A 
274. Bhutan ACC. Amwal Rt'port 20f.l (Thimphu: t\CC. .2015 l. pp. 39-40 . 
.275. Palmier, 17/t' ( 'mllrol <l{!Jun•mtcmlic Corruption. pp. 34-35 . 
.276. Jon S.T. Qm1h, "Different l'aths to Curbing Cormption: A Comparative Analysis," in 
Quah (Ed.), DUJi.•twll Paths to Cur/Jill~ Cormption. pp . .225-232. 
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ACA like Singapore's CPIB or Hong Kong's ICAC. They should also 
avoid creating a Type B ACA like South Korea's ACRC, which cannot 
investigate corruption cases, or Philippines' OMB, which is severely 
understaffed and poorly funded. 
Unlike the CPIB and ICAC, the ACAs in many Asian countries are 
ineffective because of their governments' weak political will, as reflected 
in "their inadequate legal powers, limited budgets, lack of trained 
personnel, and lack of independence." 277 In other words, most Asian 
ACAs have not performed well because they are not independent, well-
staffed or adequately funded. This means that these AC As can only 
improve their performance if their governments provide them with the 
necessary operational autonomy, personnel and budgets to perform 
effectively. Thus, China's CCDI, India's CBI, Philippines' OMB and 
South Korea's ACRC would continue to be ineffective A CAs unless their 
governments protect their independence and provide them with sutlicient 
budgets and personnel. 
Policymakers in those Asian countries like Japan and Papua New 
Guinea, which do not rely on A CAs to curb corruption, must be willing to 
provide the required independence, budget and personnel if they wish to 
establish a Type A AC A. Japan signed the UNCAC on December 9, 2003 
and its reluctance to ratify it during the past 14 years reflects its 
government's unwillingness to establish a Type A ACA to eradicate the 
existing system of structural corruption, which favors the "rotten triangle" 
of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. Japan's continued 
non-ratification of the UNCAC indicates its reluctance to establish a Type 
A ACA to replace the ineffective and inadequately slatTed special 
investigation departments of the Public Prosecutor's Offices in Tokyo, 
Osaka and Nagoya. nx 
Papua New Guinea does not have an ACA because it has relied since 
its independence in 1975 on the Ombudsman Commission to investigate 
complaints of maladministration, including corruption, and to enforce the 
Leadership Code to ensure that those in leadership positions behave with 
integrity. 279 In 1997, the first draft bill to establish an ICAC in Papua New 
277. Jon S.T. Quah. ··controlling Corruption in Asian Countries: The Eltt~ive Search for 
Success." in Ting Gong and I an Scott ( Eds. ). Ro111/ed~e /lam/hook o{ Cormptioll ill Asia 
(london: Routledge. 2017), p. 2~6. 
278. Quah, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five Asian 
Countries." pp. 156-157. 
279. Albert Mcllam and Daniel Aloi, National Integrity ,\)·slems, 1hmsparell(\' 
lnterna/iona/ Cotmlry S1111~\' Rqmrl: l'ap11a New Guim.>tt 20£13 (l'ort Moresby: Institute of 
National Affairs, 21J03), pp. 30-31. 
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Guinea failed because it lacked sufficient parliamentary support. To cope 
with the absence of an ACA, Prime Minister Peter O'Neill formed the 
Investigation Task Force Sweep (ITFS) on August 12, 20 II to investigate 
corruption allegations in the Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring initially, but its mandate was later extended to the 
investigation of corruption in all government departments. With the prime 
minister's support, the ITFS was effective during its first three years as it 
convicted some high-profile politicians. However, its funding was cut 
after it served the prime minister with an arrest warrant for corruption in 
June 2014.280 
Papua New Guinea's short-lived experiment of relying on the ITFS 
to curb corruption is instructive for policymakers in other Asian countries 
in two respects. First, it shows the futility of establishing a temporary task 
force to combat corruption instead of a permanent ACA. The second and 
more important lesson to learn from the ITFS episode is that Papua New 
Guinea's government must establish an independent Type A ACA that is 
both well-staffed and adequately funded so that its budget cannot be 
reduced arbitrarily by the prime minister if he is displeased with its actions. 
The failure of Papua New Guinea to establish a Type A ACA after 20 years 
should not minimize the importance of ensuring its independence and 
allocation of sufficient budget and personnel when it is formed. However, 
Act Now, a civil advocacy group in Papua New Guinea, has recently 
criticized the government for removing the proposed ICAC's powers of 
arrest and prosecution and making the prime minister in charge of the 
appointment process of the commissioners in the draft ICAC legislation. 
These amendments will make the proposed ICAC .. toothless" and 
vulnerable to political interference. 281 
F. Resist Temptation to Usc the ACA as an Attack Dog 
As the Type A ACA has enormous powers, policymakers must avoid 
making the serious mistake of giving into the temptation of using it as an 
attack dog against their political opponents. Governments lacking the 
strong political will to combat corruption usually establish ACAs as attack 
dogs to conduct .. witch hunts" to .. attack and eliminate members of the 
opposition or to punish members of their own party who are perceived as 
280. Grant W. Walton. "Silent Screams and Muffied Cries: The Ineffectiveness of Anti-
Corruption Measur~'S in Papua New Guinea," .·hitm l:'ducatiollmul IJ.-,·dopmellt Studies, 5 (2) 
(2016): 218. 
2MI. "PNG Government removes critical powers !rom proposed corruption watchdog," 
l'acijic lsla11ds News Association. September 19, 2017. and "I'NG government criticised for 
watering down ICAC draft." Radio New lea/mul. September 20. 2017. 
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having stepped out of line."182 Corruption charges have been used as a 
weapon to discredit political rivals and settle political scores in many 
Asian countries, including Cambodia, China. Indonesia. Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam.m Hence, it is not surprising 
that corruption is widespread in these Asian countries judging from their 
CPI scores in 20 16. 
As mentioned in Section IV.A, anti-corruption campaigns arc used in 
China against political enemies to undennine their power base in the CCP 
as shown in the persecution of CHEN Xitong, CHEN Liangyu, BO Xilai 
and ZHOU Yongkang for corruption from 1995 to 2014. Prime Minister 
HUN Sen has used the campaign against illegal logging in Cambodia to 
remove those military officers who threatened his power. 2H4 In Myanmar, 
the government has abused the anti-corruption laws to remove its political 
opponents, including the arrest in 2004 of fonner Prime Minister General 
KHIN Nyunt, his colleagues and family members on corruption 
charges.285 In Pakistan, "successive governments issued injunctions to 
control corruption" but "more often than not, it was the political goal of 
eliminating opposition which prompted legislation and subsequent court 
trials for corruption."286 
The reliance on ACAs as attack dogs against political opponents 
undennines the public trust in their governments and their legitimacy 
because it confinns that these governments are not committed to 
minimizing corruption in their countries but use corruption as a weapon to 
eliminate their political foes. As "corruption influences the level of trust," 
it flourishes in those countries with "low levels of trust" and their citizens 
arc likely to distrust their governments if the AC As and other anti-
corruption policies are ineffective. 287 This means that citizens living in 
those Asian countries with rampant corruption would have low trust in 
their politicians. Hence, it is not surprising that South Korea and 
Philippines, which are ranked 96th and 99th, respectively, among 138 
282. Meagher and Voland, "Anti-Corruption Agencies," p. 6. 
283. Djalal, "Southeast Asia," pp. 32-33; and AsianlmelliRence. No. 896, March 19,2014, 
p. 2. 
284. Djalal, "Southeast Asia." p. 32. 
285. Quah, "Minimizing Corruption in Myanmar.'' 185. 
286. Mohammad Wasccm, "Corruption. Violence ilnd Criminali7.ation of l'olitics in 
Pakistan," in K.M. de Silva, G.H. Peiris and S.W.R. de A. Samamsinghc (Eds.), Corruption in 
Sowh Asia - India, Pakistan and Sri l.anka (Kandy: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 
2002), p. 158. 
2!!7. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palilka, Cormption am/ Gowmnwm: Causes, 
Consequences. and Reform. 2~>~ edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 20 16), pp. 248, 
256-257,259. 
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countries for the public trust in politicians in 2016, have lower levels of 
trust in their politicians than Singapore (ranked I st) and Hong Kong SAR 
(ranked 2P1).288 
G. Combating Corruption by Sector 
The sectoral approach is recommended for combating corruption in 
Asian countries because the best way to control its spread is by analysing 
"its impact sector-by-sector." 289 As the incidence or vulnerability to 
corruption varies by sectors in many countries, it makes sense to allocate 
the limited anti-corruption resources to those sectors that are more 
vulnerable to corruption. As Table 29 confirms that the police are the most 
corrupt institution in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam, anti-
corruption efforts in these nine countries should focus on minimizing 
police corruption. Political parties in India, Japan, South Korea, Maldives, 
Nepal and Thailand also require reform because they are perceived to be 
the most corrupt institution in these six countries. As the parliaments in 
Indonesia, Japan and Maldives are perceived to be the most corrupt 
institution, they must also be reformed. Finally, reforms must be initiated 
in the civil services in Mongolia and Pakistan, and the judiciary in 
Afghanistan and Cambodia, to minimize corruption in these four 
countries. 
Two World Bank economists have recommended the use of"a road-
map approach" to track corruption vulnerabilities at the sector level 
because it "orients policymakers toward results that a sector or core 
process is supposed to achieve." Furthermore, this approach provides "a 
more structured and detailed picture of a problem area and the potential 
points of vulnerabilities specific to that area" and identifies "key 
vulnerabilities" and "remedial measures that could have the greatest 
impact on combating corruption in a problem area." Finally, the road-map 
approach enables program implementers to track the incidence of 
corruption throughout the program cycle so that they can initiate early 
action where corruption has occurred.290 Thus, the road-map approach is 
288. Klaus Schwab (Ed.), The Global Competitireness Report 2016-2017 (Geneva: World 
Economic Forum, 2016 ), pp. 197. 225, 297. 3 19. 
289. Bertram I. Spector, "Fighting Corruption," in Bertram I. Spector (Ed.), Fighting 
Cormption in De1•eloping Countries: Strllt,•gies and Ana(rsis (Bloomfield, CT: Kumerian Press, 
2005), p. 6. 
290. J. Edgardo Campos and Vinay Bhargava, "Introduction: Tackling a Social Pandemic," 
in J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan (Eds.), The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking 
Vulnerabilities at the Sec/or Lew/ (Washington. DC: World Bank, 2007), p. 8. 
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practical because it focuses on "area-specific problems and solutions and 




















Table 29: Perceptions of Corruption in 17 
Asian Countries by Institutiona in 2013 
Police Political Parliament Civil 
Parties Servants 
2.9 3.0 3.1 3.3 
3.9 3.4 3.2 2.9 
3.1 2.8 2.4 2.9 
4.1 4.4 3.8 3.8 
4.5 4.3 4.5 4.0 
3.8 4.2 4.2 3.9 
3.2 3.9 3.8 3.3 
4.0 3.8 3.3 3.3 
3.2 4.2 4.2 3.3 
3.9 3.7 3.7 4.2 
4.3 4.6 4.2 4.4 
4.3 4.2 3.8 4.3 
4.4 4.0 3.8 4.0 
4.0 3.7 3.5 3.8 
3.8 3.4 3.1 3.0 
4.0 4.0 3.4 3.7 



















•The other seven institutions - private sector, medical and health, education system, media, 
military. nongovernmental organizations, and religious bodies - arc excluded because of 
their lower perceived incidence of corruption. The score ranges from I (not at all corrupt) 
to 5 (extreme I y corrupt). 
Source: Transparency International, Global Cormption Barometer 2013 (Berlin: 
Transparency International, 2013), pp. 35-38. 
Policymakers concerned with tackling rampant corruption in Asian 
countries should adopt the sectoral approach for two reasons. First, it 
enables those governments committed to curbing corruption to concentrate 
their limited resources in the most vulnerable sectors. Second, this 
pragmatic strategy not only enhances the likelihood of success but should 
also have positive spill-over effects on combating corruption in other 
sectors because it demonstrates that rampant corruption can be defeated. 
291. Ibid., p. 10. 
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H. Nurture "Pockets of Effectiveness" 
In his research on Nigeria, Roll has identified "pockets of 
effectiveness" or those "public organizations which deliver public services 
relatively effectively in contexts of largely ineffective government" and 
widespread corruption.292 A public organization in Nigeria is a "pocket of 
effectiveness" only if it is effective in providing public services for the 
public good for at least three years. Among the seven Nigerian public 
organizations identified as "pockets of effectiveness," the two outstanding 
examples are the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and 
Control, and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons 
and Other Related Matters. These two organizations are efTective because 
of their reliance on recruiting stafT on the basis of merit, integrity and 
commitment; the incentives for training and performance: strict 
disciplinary control to prevent corruption; and inclusive leadership and 
management skills. 293 
The identification of "pockets of effectiveness" by scholars in 
countries with rampant corruption gives hope to policymakers and 
reformers in Asian countries that systemic corruption can be defeated by 
first identifying and supporting those exceptional public organizations 
which are effective in combating corruption. Karklins contends that 
"islands of integrity" can 'jump-start public confidence in reform" and 
"trigger the subsequent improvement of other institutions." These "small, 
initial successes" can "signal that corruption can be stopped" and have "a 
snowball effect'' by encouraging actors in other sectors to follow suit.294 
The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) is "a pocket of 
effectiveness" in the Philippines because it has succeeded in increasing 
foreign investment and providing more than six million jobs and remained 
corruption-free in the midst of widespread corruption in the country. Its 
first director-general, Lilu de Lima, reduced PEZA's bloated workforce of 
I ,016 personnel to 450 workers during her first year and dismissed those 
employees who were found guilty of corruption offenses. She was given 
the Ramon Magsaysay Award in 20 17 for transforming the PEZA into "a 
showcase of successful regulatory reform, a model institution of honest 
292. Michael Roll. The Srate thai Works: ''l'ockt•ts oll;/kctil•t•m·.~s" as a Pt•rspeclil•e 011 
Statc11css ill /Je\'elopi11g Cmmrrit•s ( Mainz: Department of Anthropology and African Studies, 
Johannes Gutenberg University, Working Paper No. 121!, 20 II). p. I. Sec also, Michael Roll 
(Ed.). 71u· l'olitics <!ll'ublic Sec/or l'n:fimntmct•: l'ocket.~ <!l l;l]<•clil'em•.tl ill Dt•1•dopi11g 
Cou/1/ries (London: Routledge, 2014). 
293. Roll, 111e State that Works, pp. 4-6, 11-13. 
294. Rasma Karklins, 111e System Made Me /Jo It: Corruption in Po.~t-Cmmmmist Societies 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 2005), p. 159. 
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and committed public service, and a key contributor to the nation's 
economic growth."295 
A nationwide campaign known as "Integrity Idol" was conducted by 
citizens in 2014 to identifY the most honest civil servant in Nepal. On 
January II, 2015, Panchthar District Education Officer, Gyan Mani Nepal, 
was selected as the "Integrity Idol" from more than 300 civil servants 
nominated by citizens across Nepal for the award. 296 Governments in 
Asian countries with widespread corruption should take a leaf from 
Nepal's "Integrity Idol" campaign to conduct nationwide campaigns to ask 
their citizens to nominate the most honest or least corrupt public agency. 
Such campaigns will not only help the governments to identify "anti-
corruption champions" or "pockets of effectiveness" in combating 
corruption like PEZA in the Philippines, but also enable them to give 
national recognition to these exceptional honest public agencies in their 
countries. 
I. Combating Corruption is a Continuous Work in Progress 
Combating corruption in Asian countries is a continuous work in 
progress because, apart from the resources and expertise required by the 
Type A A CAs, the implementation of the anti-corruption laws would be 
strongly resisted by those intelligent and powerful corrupt individuals and 
organizations with vested interests to circumvent these laws to avoid arrest 
and conviction for their offenses. The challenge of combating political 
corruption, organized crime and vote-buying in Taiwan is described as 
"beheading the Hydra," the Greek mythical creature with several heads 
that grew again when cut off. 297 
To combat corruption successfully, governments in the Asian 
countries must persevere and implement sustained anti-corruption 
campaigns because corruption is like "a snake which will frequently 
respond with poison, and will only die with repeated attack" and "only if 
severed at the head."298 They must also undertake the difficult tasks of 
identifYing accurately the causes of corruption and implement appropriate 
295. Roy Stephen C. Canivcl, "How ex-Peza chief kept agency corruption-free," Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, August 28, 20 17. 
296. "Panchthar DEO awarded with 'Integrity Idol'," Kathmandu Post, January 12, 2015, 
and Pete Pattisson, "Nepal's Integrity Idol seeks civil servants with the X factor," The Guardian, 
December II, 2014. 
297. Christian Gobel, "Beheading the Hydra: Combating Political Corruption and Organized 
Crime," China Perspectiws, 56 (November-December 2004): 1-17. 
298. Laurence Cockcroft, Global Cormption: Money, Power and Ell1ics in the Modem 
World (London: 1.8. Tauris, 2012), pp. 231-232. 
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reforms to address these causes over a sustained period of time. The 
previous sections have shown that the governments in China, India, 
Philippines and South Korea have not only neglected these important tasks 
but have also relied on ineffective and poorly-resourced Type B ACAs to 
enforce their anti-corruption laws selectively and not impartially. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that these four countries have failed to 
minimize corruption. 
Even though Singapore and Hong Kong SAR have succeeded in 
curbing corruption, this does not mean that their governments and ACAs 
can rest on their laurels because of the growing importance of private 
sector corruption and other threats. The investigation and conviction of 
four senior civil servants for corruption offenses during 20 I 0-2013 
indicates that even though corruption is not a serious problem in 
Singapore, the CPIB must remain vigilant to deal not only with public 
sector corruption but with the increasing number of private sector 
corruption cases in recent years. The shocking revelation in July 2013 that 
the CPIB's assistant director, Edwin Yeo, misappropriated US$1.41 
million during 2008-2012 has tarnished the CPIB 's reputation even though 
he was found guilty and jailed for ten years. The ICAC has also not 
hesitated to investigate political leaders and senior civil servants in Hong 
Kong if they are accused of corruption offenses. As mentioned above, the 
investigation of former Chief Executive Donald Tsang in February and 
April 2012 resulted in his conviction and sentencing to 20 months' 
imprisonment in February 2017 for misconduct in public office. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Those who are corrupt are not simply "had" [but] evil to the 
core. 
Laura S. Underkuffier99 
As the lack of political will and capacity is the most important reason 
for the failure of many Asian countries to curb corruption effectively 
during the past six decades, their governments need substantial doses of 
political will and capacity to implement impartially comprehensive 
reforms to address the causes of corruption and to sustain their 
implementation over a long period of time. However, this is a tall order 
because of the scarcity and fragility of political will in these countries. 
299. Laum S. Underkuffier, Caplllred br E1•i/: 11w !tlea t!/Corruption in Law (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2013), p.90. 
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Whether the policymakers in those Asian countries with rampant 
corruption can draw lessons from the success stories of Singapore and 
Hong Kong SAR, and the failures of China, India, Philippines and South 
Korea, depends on their political will and capacity to establish Type A 
ACAs and provide them with the necessary legal powers. budget, 
personnel and operational autonomy to enforce the anti-corruption laws 
impartially. This means that the Type A ACAs should operate as 
independent watchdogs that investigate all corruption complaints 
impartially, regardless of the status, position, or political atliliation of 
those persons being investigated. These Type A ACAs should not be used 
as attack dogs against their governments' political opponents, or as paper 
tigers without the required resources and powers to investigate corruption 
cases. 
As combating corruption in Asian countries is a continuous work in 
progress, policymakers concerned with improving the effectiveness of 
A CAs in their countries must be realistic because the prospects for success 
also depend on their ability to overcome the constraints of their 
unf~!Vorable policy contexts, especially in those large Asian countries with 
huge populations and poor governance. As sound political leadership is 
the critical ingredient tor effective corruption control, the $64,000 
question is: Whether the citizens in Asian countries with widespread 
corruption have the wisdom to elect honest and competent leaders to 
political office to implement the necessary reforms to address the causes 
of corruption? Ifthey fail to do so, corruption would remain a way of life 
because corrupt individuals and organizations in their countries would 
continue to misbehave with impunity and encourage others to follow suit. 
The price for inaction against these corrupt and evil individuals is too high 
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